The Coalition is marching toward electoral oblivion — and is near the point of no return
Why a comeback for Morrison in 2022 is much harder than in 2019
The first Newspoll of the year delivered a devastating result for the Morrison government. The Labor party has a lead of 56–44 on the two-party preferred vote, which, if replicated on election day, would see the Coalition suffer a swing of 7.5 percent against it. Of course, electoral swings vary across seats — elections tend to tighten during campaigns and opinion polls can be frustratingly inaccurate. Thus, despite trailing in all published opinion polls in the months leading up to the 2019 election, the Morrison government still managed to pull off a remarkable election victory.
As in 2019, the Coalition are coming from behind, but this time their position in the lead-up to the election is far worse.
Scott Morrison’s unexpected 2019 comeback is the likely reason Coalition MPs are not panicking about their electoral prospects (at least not yet). As Agriculture minister David Littleproud observed last week: ‘If I had a lazy 100 [dollars], I’d put it on us. We were in the same position last time’.
But is he right to say that? Just as in 2019, the Coalition are certainly coming from behind, but this time their position in the lead-up to the election is far worse. Political parties trailing in opinion polls need time to narrow the gap, but with only three months until an election needs to be called, time is almost up for Morrison to recover.
The political situation is worse for the Government now than in 2019 for quite a number of reasons. For one, the polls are worse; as of 22 February of this year, an aggregate of all recent opinion polls has Labor leading 56–44. At the same time in 2019, Labor had an aggregate poll lead of 53.2–46.8. Anthony Albanese is also less unpopular than Bill Shorten as opposition leader, with a net +1 approval rating in the latest Newspoll, versus Shorten’s net -18 approval rating in a Newspoll taken at the same time in 2019. Crucially, Morrison is also much less liked in 2019, with a net -12 approval rating according to the latest Newspoll, compared to a net -6 approval rating in late February 2019.
The threat of small-l liberal independents, furious with the government’s inaction on climate change, means Morrison is curtailed in his ability to run a scare campaign…
Of course, polls are only a snapshot of past sentiment. It is also important to consider the way in which the lead-up to the May 2022 election is different to the May 2019 election leadup. Firstly, there is the substantial challenge posed by small-l liberal independents in inner city seats. Sure, there were significant independent challengers in Gilmore, Wentworth and Warringah in 2019, but this time round there are far more independent candidates — with substantial grassroots and financial support. They pose a serious threat in six Coalition seats: Flinders, Goldstein, Kooyong, North Sydney, Wentworth and Mackellar.
Even if the Morrison government held the line against Labor in traditional marginal seats, losing these inner-city seats to independents would ensure the government loses its majority.
The threat of small-l liberal independents, furious with the government’s inaction on climate change, means Morrison is curtailed in his ability to run a scare campaign against Labor’s supposed ‘secret carbon tax’. Much was made in the aftermath of the 2019 election at how Shorten had tried (and failed) to tailor his message on climate change to different political constituencies; in 2022, the onus is on Morrison to try to pull this off. It won’t be easy.
Moreover, even if Morrison wanted to ignore the inner-city seats and run a full-throated attack on Labor’s climate change policy, the salience of this attack would probably be less than in 2019. In 2019, the Adani mine epitomised for many voters the tangible losses in jobs that Labor’s climate change policy posed. Adani will play a minor role in this election campaign, and the fact that the Coalition have committed to net zero emission in 2050 would make a scare campaign even less credible.
The other element of the Coalition’s scare campaign in 2019 was centred on Labor’s policy platform. This included unpopular taxation changes, such as the removal of franking credits and negative gearing. This time around, Labor has adopted a small target approach, and have not specified any changes to tax policy.
It will therefore be far harder to fearmonger about how radical Labor is — especially considering that unlike in 2019, the Coalition won’t benefit from Clive Palmer’s anti-Labor advertising. Indeed, with Palmer running on an anti-vaccine mandate platform, he is likely to be equally critical of the major parties.
What’s also interesting about Palmer’s intervention is he’s running primarily against policies imposed by the state premiers. The role of the premiers in this election promises to be far more significant than in 2019, and in a way that is likely to hurt the Morrison government. Morrison is essentially damned if he does, damned if he doesn’t: criticising the states for their vaccine mandates, or in WA’s case for the extension of their state border closure, is electorally risky, as the premiers are collectively far more popular than Morrison — however, not criticising them will incur Palmer’s wrath. This would not be a huge problem if the Morrison government expected preference flows from Palmer’s party to strongly favour the Coalition; however, if Palmer preferences against sitting members, as he is threatening to do, this could be hugely damaging for the Coalition.
Morrison’s task is overall much harder — and time is fast running out for his government.
Finally, unlike in 2019, the Coalition cannot emphasise their strong economic management credentials by pointing to a promised budget surplus. The size of the budget deficit or surplus has in political discourse long been seen as a proxy for the strength of the economy. In 2019, the Coalition made much of the fact that they were delivering a budget surplus (in the end, they didn’t) and that Labor’s tax and spending promises threatened that surplus, and therefore would undermine the strength of the economy.
Given the massive budget deficit accrued as a result of the fiscal stimulus that was needed to prop up the economy during the lockdowns, there is no prospect of either party achieving a surplus for many years. The criteria for responsible economic management has been reshaped, and not in a way that suits the Coalition.
What all these factors point to is that the circumstances of the next few months are radically different to the lead-up to the 2019 election. Morrison’s task is overall much harder — and time is fast running out for his government.
Having said that, there are three other factors that were not present in 2019 that also have the potential to impact the election result. The first is how severe Covid-19 will be in the next few months; the second is economic conditions; and the third is the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the salience of national security as an election issue. They are different to some of the previously mentioned factors, because we cannot say with much certainty how they will shape the election result, if at all. But unlike the previously mentioned factors, these factors may help Morrison’s re-election prospects.
It is these known unknowns that I will consider in my next piece.
Connor Harvey is a semi-regular contributor to Statecraft, and a member of the Australian Labor Party. If you found this piece interesting, you may like his post-mortem of Labor’s performance in the 2019 election: High Road to the Political Wilderness.
Statecraft is your home of all things analytical, opinionated, and sometimes insightful this election cycle. For more election coverage, see Tom Watson’s analysis of the January Newspoll: It’s the Pandemic, Stupid.
Thanks to Caitlin Goston & Genevieve Campbell for editing this piece. If you agree, disagree, or have something to add, consider sending a letter to the editor at publications@uqppes.com.au, or commenting below.
