Analysis | Optimizing Foreign Service assignment rotations
Rotating assignments are the norm in diplomatic careers — but are they effective?
This piece is part of ISD’s blog series, “A better diplomacy,” which highlights innovators and their big ideas for how to make diplomacy more effective, resilient, and adaptive in the 21st century.
No one likes moving their household: the sorting, the packing, the unpacking, the missed items, the unwanted bag of useless power cables. And yet, despite the obvious strain that moving places on workers and their families, virtually every developed country’s diplomatic service and even some corporations employ the practice. When done correctly, the habit of routinely reassigning staff to new positions can have tangible benefits to both employers and workers. Of course, when executed poorly, results can be mixed.
To get the most out of employee rotations within an organization requires both individual and systemic discipline. In a recent post in The Diplomatic Pouch, my colleague Aaron Garfield called for reforms to the State Department’s jobs assignment process, advocating for an approach that emphasizes planning for future talent needs and expertise. While I agree with his assessment, I would also advocate for a close look at the foundational aspects of State’s approach to rotating employees through positions. Evidence suggests effective staff rotations can lead to higher employee retention, better engagement, and in some cases, improved innovation. But for that to be true, according to the best available evidence, several factors need to be addressed.
[Read “It’s time to reform the Foreign Service assignments process”]
1. Mobility Run Amok
An obvious limitation to the practice of assigning staff to a variety of roles, or rotating diplomats around the world, is that multi-year initiatives suffer. Nalbantian and coauthors wrote in Harvard Business Review of a company where products typically took three to five years to develop, yet those who “made decisions about product design or production were on the job for only 15 to 18 months.” That is, those with the greatest stake in the initiative rotated to their next assignment before seeing any results, or indeed, consequences.
This misaligned timescale may seem like an easily fixed, perhaps even trivial, detail, yet it belies a deeper issue: structure matters. For an assignments-based system to work, the timeframes and incentives need to align with both the employee’s goals and with the institution’s. Transferring a diplomat in the middle of a free trade agreement or fresh political instability in a foreign capital is unwise, since the officer’s replacement will need to waste precious time simply coming up to speed. In contrast, the State Department’s rigid one-size-fits-all approach all but precludes the flexibility of longer or shorter assignments based on mission objectives.
2. Breadth matters
Case studies of the highest performing diplomats and executives show that they have a breadth of experience across multiple domains. One of the 20th century’s most celebrated American diplomats, George Shultz, exemplifies this breadth of experience. He is the only person to ever hold four separate cabinet positions (State, Treasury, Office of Management and Budget, and Labor). His six and a half years running the State Department, second in duration only to Dean Rusk in the 1960s, is widely regarded as transformational both for U.S. foreign policy and of the Foreign Service as an institution. In addition to a wide knowledge base within government, he held a doctorate from MIT in industrial economics and taught business management there in the 1960s and at the University of Chicago. Outside of government, Shultz ran the global engineering firm Bechtel beginning in 1975, distinguishing himself as an apt executive.
Though an Ivy League PhD and grand political connections may be unattainable for most, there is nonetheless wisdom to be gained from Shultz’ career path — rather than viewing his background in economics and later his role as Secretary of Labor as disconnected from his tenure at State, he leveraged those experiences to have a better understanding of what we now refer to as political economy. In the context of the Cold War, having a firm grasp of the intersection between leadership, economics, and geopolitics was a critical component to Shultz’ effectiveness as Secretary of State.
While some may argue that most Foreign Service Officers are already well-rounded “generalists,” the data suggests most diplomats stick narrowly within their specialty, and indeed, are frequently penalized with slower promotions when they stray into adjacent functions (an economic track officer moving into public affairs, for example). Further, especially at the senior ranks, officials rarely have meaningful experiences outside of the State Department. Though some exchange programs exist, they are small and often considered to be blemishes on one’s career. A better approach would be to do away with career tracks altogether, replacing them instead with competencies. This would highlight an individual diplomat’s ability to perform well in specific domains without boxing them into a fixed career path. At present, new entrants to the Foreign Service are required to select a career track before they even begin the lengthy recruitment process — an absurd task given most have no practical understanding of what each job speciality entails.
3. Embrace failure
A “growth mindset” as defined by Stanford psychologist Carol Dweck and colleagues, is a belief that one’s capacity and talent can improve with time. This contrasts with a “fixed mindset,” where an individual believes they lack talent in a particular domain without the ability to improve. In the context of rotating diplomats (or any professional) in various roles within an organization, having a growth mindset is key to unlocking the potential benefits of the program.
If a staff member approaches each new assignment with a willingness to develop shortcomings and learn from failures, the organization benefits from a more well-rounded employee. Of course, while this may lead to short-term dips in performance as employees adjust to new roles, the organization benefits in the long run from a larger talent-pool for executive positions, where understanding the bigger picture and multiple aspects of the mission are critical. (Yet, this individual growth is impossible absent psychological safety and a firm learning culture in place, as I have previously argued.) If, on the other hand, diplomats choose to repeat the same types of work without branching into different functional areas, the benefits of rotation diminish.
To get the most from staff as they rotate through jobs, an organization must fully support a growth mindset, encouraging employees to gain expertise outside of their core domains. The State Department could do this by expanding existing exchange programs and by rewarding employees who have genuinely broad experiences with leadership positions and greater responsibility. Executive education can also play a role, especially when staff study at distant institutions and are exposed to new ideas and methods.
Indeed, Congress codified this desire for external experiences in the newly-passed State Department Authorization bill, which calls for the Secretary of State to “expand the provision of professional development and career advancement opportunities” including academic programs, private-public exchanges, and details to private and international organizations. Given the ongoing war for talent and the possible exodus of diplomats, time is of the essence. The State Department simply cannot afford to allow these improvements to languish for years in bureaucratic gridlock.
As organizations grapple with the complex task of developing the next generation of leaders while balancing individual career prospects with institutional needs, we can draw from the work of entrepreneur and author Safi Bahcall. Bahcall argues, while focusing on an organization’s culture receives a good deal of attention in traditional management theory, changing it is a matter of altering the underlying structure, rather than focusing on surface issues. In the case of State, this may mean a fundamental rethink of how diplomats are rewarded and for what. It also means an honest, data-driven examination of the current assignments system. While identifying shortcomings in current assignment practice is relatively simple, creating something with better outcomes is a complex undertaking.
Zed Tarar is a career member of the U.S. Foreign Service and is currently serving in London. He is a contributing writer for The Diplomatic Pouch.
Disclaimer: While Zed Tarar is a career U.S. diplomat, the views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of State or the U.S. government.
Read more pieces in the series:
