The Subtle Doctor and Free Will, Part 2

Duns Scotus on Freedom of the Will and Divine Foreknowledge

Consider this a new take on an old post. A few years back I a piece on Scotus and divine foreknowledge. However, since reading further on Scotus, I was proven to be incorrect regarding Scotus’ view of free will. Sotus was not a compatibalist, rather he would have defended a libertarian conception of free will for both created man, and for God himself (see here for Duns Sctous’ conception of free will).

Moving on, here is the argument against the compatibility of free will

(1t)God timelessly knows T.

(2t)If E is in the timeless realm, then it is now-necessary that T.

(3t)It is now-necessary that T. [1, 2]

(4)If it is now-necessary that T, then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [Definition of “necessary”]

(5)Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [4, 5]

(6)If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely. [Principle of Alternate Possibilities]

(7)Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, you will not do it freely. [5, 6] [1]

For Scotus, it would not follow that if E — E being the event of God timelessly knowing T — is in the timeless realm, it is now-necessary that T. For Scotus, the will proceeds the intellect, that is, God knows x because he wills x. I will answer the phone tomorrow because from eternal present of God, and the moment I choose to answer, he and I freely willed I would answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, and that I could have done otherwise. Following this act of will he knows what will come to pass.

For Scotus, the premise is supported because timeless eternity and the present are both contingent since their relationship is individually unable to bring about a free action, but must work together. The relationship God has with creation is that of an essential, rather than accidental, series of causality. The difference between the two can be seen as the difference between the mother giving life to her son, and a hockey player using a stick to handle a puck. The son is still alive given that he can survive without his mother, but the motion of the player, and the stick, are both in use when transferring motion to the puck at a constant rate, this rate will be terminated when the player and stick terminate. The essential series is more analogous to the player, and the accidental series to the mother.

God is the more emanate source, like the player, but, unlike the player, is not moving his object (man) to act in a certain way. Rather, God and our free will are more like how the formal and material causes (ex. the shape of the tree, and the matter the tree is made of) of our action, working with no priority to one another, but always actualizing the same thing. Likewise, God and human beings are co-causes. Scotus rejects the Thomistic view that nothing is moved without the movement of another and cites the free will of man as the exception. While God is responsible for bringing the free will of man into existence, he allows it to move on its own.

This brings on the question, if man willed otherwise, would that have caused God to will otherwise, if yes, then that would entail we can change the will of God. If no, that would entail we don’t will freely. The way of combating the objection — I would say; Scotus doesn’t really formulate the following distinction — would be in distinguishing God’s permissive will, and his active will. God’s permissive will allows the human will to act in either way, but his active will acts to bring it about. The ontological priority works as such,

1. God wills to conserve a human will into existence at all times with his active will.
2. The human will moves to bring about an outcome and God’s will permits the outcome, by providing it the being to bring about what it chooses.
3. The outcome is brought about.

Human free will resides in the second step, along with God’s permissive will sustaining its existence and permitting the action to take place. God knows what human beings choose because he knows his essence, which is identical with what he wills (both permissively and actively). Since what God wills is contingent, so is his knowledge of it. This is not to say God’s willing is contingent, after all, what one wills differs from the fact that one wills.