Retro Analysis: FC Barcelona’s 3–4–3 in 2011/12
Pep Guardiola’s tactical madness in his last Barcelona season analysed
Introduction
Pep Guardiola’s reign from 2008–2012 goes down in history as one of the most successful this sport has ever witnessed. The Spaniard wasn’t just successful at winning titles, he also revolutionised football with his unique style of play.
The 2010/11 season is often regarded as Barcelona’s greatest season under Pep Guardiola. The Catalan’s won the Champions League, the Spanish League and the Spanish Supercopa. Additionally, their way of winning these trophies was outstanding. The Barcelona of 2010/11 was purely based on positioning, aiming to create different kinds of superiorities (e.g.: numerical, positional, qualitative…) to progress and eventually create goal-scoring chances.
It was a tough task to beat this highly successful season and improve the squad even more. However, the tactical mastermind, Pep Guardiola, accepted the challenge. Inspired by his earlier coach, Johan Cruyff, Guardiola brought in a 3-Diamond-3/3–3–4 formation. Nevertheless, that wasn’t the only difference. The style of play also changed to a more fluid one.
Note: Barcelona also played a 4–3–3 during that season but used the 3–4–3 in nearly the same number of games. This article focuses only on the 3–4–3 in possession, as it was tactically the most fascinating aspect of Barcelona in the 2011/12 season.
Structure
As mentioned earlier, Barcelona played in a 3-Diamond-3 or 3–3–4 formation in possession, depending on how you want to call it. However, as the coach once said, these are just numbers and don’t really represent the way of playing of the team.
“4–2–3–1, 4–4–2, 4–2–2–2, or 3–4–3 are just phone numbers, the most important thing is not the system but the idea.” (Guardiola)
For example, a team can play in a high-pressing, possession-based 4–3–3 or in a low-block, counterattacking 4–3–3. The most important aspect is the strategy not the basic formation.
Additionally, sometimes it wasn’t even possible to name the structure of Barcelona in possession with numbers. This Barcelona side was highly fluid in possession and, especially in the midfield, players could position themselves more or less freely. Another argument, why formations aren’t that important.
Let’s examine the Barcelona structure and the tasks of each player in this system: In goal, Victor Valdes was essential for Barcelona. Not just his abilities to stop shots, but also his ball-playing abilities were from immense importance. It was very unusual during that time, that goalkeepers were included in the in-possession phase of the team. However, it can bring a lot of advantages, something I’m going to touch on more later.
This quote again shows the influence from Johan Cruyff on Pep Guardiola:
“In my teams, the goalie is the first attacker, and the striker the first defender.” (Cruyff)
Moving higher up to the backline, which was a back three during that time. Mostly, players like Puyol, Pique, Abidal, Mascherano or, rarely, Alves played in the backline. The back three sometimes played wider and sometimes narrower, which had different intentions. Additionally, the halfbacks could advance both with and without the ball. Abidal, especially, was predestined to fulfil this task because of his offensive dynamics and also defending skills.
The midfield, as already mentioned, was formed in a diamond shape most of the time. The 6, usually played by Busquets or Keita, was the base of the diamond. This position was the most static one in the midfield and very important in the build-up. However, horizontal movements to open spaces or passing lanes, dropping into the backline and movements into spaces higher up weren’t uncommon.
The two 8s were mostly played by Xavi, Iniesta, or Thiago. Iniesta usually on the left and Xavi on the right. Thiago also generally played more often on the right. However, these were just starting positions. It wasn’t unusual that the positions changed during the flow of the game. Iniesta was normally positioned higher up, looking to position himself in between the lines and regularly making threatening runs in behind. Xavi usually dropped deeper to help in the build-up and could create from this deeper position. Thiago could also often drop deep and was very important in the build-up and progress play. Nevertheless, Xavi and Thiago could also advance higher up and make runs in behind.
The tip of the diamond was normally played by Fabregas. The newcomer was essential in the attacking phase and allowed Barcelona to play this kind of formation. Like the other midfielders, he was given a lot of freedom. Often dropping deeper, to help progress or moving higher up like a striker.
The wingers, mostly Villa, Sanchez, Pedro, Alves or Cuenca, were tasked to stay wide and stretch the pitch. This opened more space inside for the midfielders and striker to operate. They had great dynamics and dribbling abilities to regularly beat their direct opponent.
Last but not least, the striker position was played by Messi. The Argentinian also had a lot of freedom and could play his familiar false nine role. Messi regularly rotated with Fabregas which allowed him to roam around even more. He tended to move to the right half-space, from where he could use his outstanding dribbling qualities and cut inside with his left foot. Additionally, he also often dropped deeper to overload the midfield and help Barcelona progress.
How Pep Guardiola thought about his central players and eventually came to this structure:
“The problem was, we had Busquets, Xavi, Iniesta, Messi, Cesc [Fabregas] and they were so good. I was thinking all the time, to put them together. […] I knew when they were all together, we were so good.” (Guardiola)
This was just a small insight, to get a better idea of this Barcelona side and the major tasks of each player. Now let’s dive a little bit deeper into their possession-play, starting with the build-up.
Build-up
As every team under Pep Guardiola, also this Barcelona side had normally more of the ball than the opponent. However, having possession of the ball wasn’t a specific goal. Instead, the ball was used as a tool.
“Possession of the ball is a tool with which you organise yourself and cause disorganisation of your opponent.” (Guardiola)
Barcelona aimed to build-up short and with the ball on the ground. Most opponents didn’t press Barcelona very high, to not risk open space in between the lines or in behind, which Barcelona could potentially exploit. Therefore, the three centre backs usually had enough time on the ball to circulate possession, find players higher up through line-breaking passes or play balls in behind.
The back three has various advantages compared to a build-up with a back four. The first one is numerical superiority, a big aim in positional play. Most opponents pressed with one or two strikers, meaning there was at least one free man in the first line. This allowed Barcelona stability and a more controlled/calmer build-up.
The free centre back then usually had space, which allowed him to dribble with the ball, which has many positive effects as well. Firstly, it offers basic space gain, meaning Barcelona is higher up with the ball. Secondly, it attracts pressure, as the defending team can’t let the centre back run through freely. This in turn opens spaces or can create a free man. Thirdly, the passing angles to access players are usually better. Fourthly, many teams aren’t/weren’t prepared on how to deal with this advancing centre back and therefore, the centre back can use his dynamical advantage and get further up or open spaces.
Abidal generally moved up very high, which was possible because the back three offers better coverage, than when a centre back moves up in a back four.
Coming back to further advantages of the back three. As the distances are usually shorter, faster ball circulation is possible. Barcelona regularly made use of this advantage, to switch the ball out of crowded zones into less crowded areas of the pitch. Furthermore, it was more difficult for the opponent to defend the faster switches of play and at some point, they messed up with shifting across, allowing Barcelona to exploit the mistake.
However, at times, the back three could stretch wider, with the halfbacks positioning themselves in the wide channel. This was probably done to stretch the first line of the opponent and open gaps inside. The amazing ball-playing qualities of the centre backs made it possible to use this radical approach, as it can be risky when the opponent is able to counterattack and exploit the spaces of the wide-stretched backline. Though, mostly only the ball-near halfback positioned himself on the wide lane, whereas the ball-far halfback tucked inside, to provide a better coverage for potential counterattacks. The structure then basically looked like a back four, but without a ball-far fullback. Another objective of the wide halfbacks was to provide a back pass option for the ball-near winger.
As already mentioned, the goalkeeper, Valdes, was also very important for Barcelona in possession, especially during the build-up. When teams rarely pressed higher, he could be used to create an 11v10 overload, as the opponent’s goalkeeper can’t press. Therefore, there always had to be a free man. Additionally, when the centre backs were under pressure and couldn’t circulate possession, Valdes could be used as an outlet. He was constantly ready to receive the ball outside of the penalty area and help his team. When Valdes received the ball, he also often attracted pressure, as playing to the goalkeeper is a pressing trigger for most teams. That’s because the goalkeeper is normally the worst player on the ball. However, as Valdes was very good with the ball, it was only logical and not too risky for Barcelona to use him during the build-up. When he attracted pressure, spaces in between the lines could open or a new free man was created.
The situation above showed already a little bit the importance of the 6 in the build-up.
The 6 was basically the base in the build-up. Busquets or Keita were regularly searched for to progress or used for lay-off options, such as seen above. The 6 could also often be found directly. That was the case, when the defensive side, mostly the midfielders, was pinned deeper because of the high numbers of Barcelona in the midfield.
However, 3rd man combinations to find the 6 weren’t uncommon either. Often a midfielder higher up dropped deeper to provide an alternative route to find the 6.
Additionally, as already mentioned in the structure section, the 6 could also make a few movements. First of all, moving horizontally. The aim was to either pull an opponent away to open spaces or a passing lane, or to move out of a cover-shadow and be accessible to progress.
Moreover, the 6 also regularly dropped into the backline. This could create an overload in the first line, but more importantly difficult situations for the opponent on how to react to this varied structure. Busquets was often man-marked, to take him out of the game. However, when the Spaniard dropped into the backline, his man-marker had to decide between following or not. When he decided to follow, huge spaces inside opened up. When the man-marker decided to stay in the 6 area, Busquets could receive with time and space and create from this deep position or circulate possession. The higher number in the first line regularly opened spaces higher up, as the opponent also had to use more players, to put the first line under sufficient pressure. The 6 could also relieve the centre backs from pressure through this dropping movement, allowing a calmer and more controlled build-up.
At times, the dropping into the backline from the 6 could also be used as a rotation. Often, the dropping movement of the 6 was a trigger for the ball-near halfback to advance. This advancing was then possible due to the better protection in the first line of the build-up and it’s also not always necessary to have four players in the first line of the build-up. Most opponents weren’t prepared for this unusual rotation, which could create a dynamical advantage.
If a halfback had the ball, was under pressure and couldn’t play to another centre back, as already mentioned, he could play backwards to the goalkeeper. However, that means that Barcelona had to build-up again from a very deep position. Another, more progressive approach to solve this situation, was an 8 dropping wide. There was often a lot of space wide, as the centre was compressed due to the high number of players in the midfield from Barcelona. The 8 therefore often had a lot of space and could create from this wide position.
Additionally, it put the opponent into a dilemma. He again had to decide between following the 8 wide or staying inside. If he stayed inside, the 8 had time and space to receive wide. If he followed, spaces would open up inside. Often, Fabregas, Messi or the ball-near winger could drop into this opened space. Furthermore, the 8 would have another angle to access central spaces (moving from out to in).
Moreover, a pass to a wide player is often a pressing trigger for most opponents, as the side-line can act as an additional defender. Barcelona made use of this fact and strategically used passes wide, to open spaces inside. To successfully use wide passes to attract pressure and then play inside, a good structure around the ball is necessary. When an 8 received wide, this usually triggered the ball-near winger from Barcelona to move inside. This could result into even more space out wide. However, more importantly was that it created a single wing occupation and no double wing occupation. Therefore, Barcelona would have more players inside to progress. Double wing occupation makes it normally more difficult to progress inside. Additionally, midfielders, Fabregas, or Messi would often shift over to provide support for the wide 8. As already mentioned, the ball-near halfback could also create a back pass option, if a pass forward wasn’t possible.
If the winger stayed wide when the 8 dropped wide, Barcelona could create a 2v1 situation out wide, which was another possible, but rarely used, option.
When the opponent, who pressed the halfback used his cover-shadow to make a pass to a wide 8 impossible, the halfback had two options. He could either play inside (as seen above with Fabregas). This player (mostly a midfielder, striker, or winger) could either receive with space and turn or play wide to the 8 (3rd man combination). When an inside pass was also not possible, the halfback could beat his opponent, by dribbling inside against the dynamics of his opponent.
As mentioned before, the 8s, Fabregas, or Messi could drop deeper to help in the build-up as well. At times, dropping besides the 6 (who usually made horizontal movements to open spaces), or a little bit higher up. Fabregas and Messi could also receive outside the block with similar dropping wide movements as the 8s. Additionally, an 8 (mostly Xavi) could also drop into the backline.
Progress play and chance creation
A few ways to progress higher up and chance creation methods were already mentioned shortly in the build-up section. However, there were many more, which I’m going to analyse in this section.
Basically, the goal for Barcelona in possession was to progress through the centre and find a free man in the midfield to eventually create chances. There were many ways on how Barcelona found a free man in the centre.
To begin with, Barcelona had with 4 to 5 players in the midfield normally an overload, which means that there is naturally a free man. Therefore, at times a centre back (or another player) could access this free man directly. These line-breaking pass were amazing and most of the time played very accurately and with sufficient speed. Due to the overload in the midfield, it was often difficult for the opponent to shift across after switches, as the distances were larger because they also had to focus on the high number of players in between the lines. The central players of Barcelona could therefore pin opponents and create more space for the free man or open a passing lane to the free man, just with their presence.
However, mostly it wasn’t that easy, as for example the distances were small, and some opponents were able to restrict central progression. Therefore, Barcelona used various mechanisms to open spaces, create a free player and find this free man.
A very important approach was to attract pressure. Barcelona regularly used short passes to provoke pressure and then make use of the opened space. Especially vertical passes, where the receiver usually has a closed body position, lured pressure effectively. A player with a closed body position is for many teams a pressing trigger, as he can only play backwards under pressure and is therefore no direct danger, which means that putting him under pressure is also less risky. This mechanism of strategically playing to a player with a closed body position was possible due to the good technical abilities of the Barcelona players and the structural support around the ball. The receiver with the closed body position normally had a back pass option to lay the ball off. This back pass option could then access a free player in the opened space.
Sometimes, it looked like Barcelona played “unnecessary” passes to a player with a closed body position, who was under pressure and couldn’t turn. But the objective was always to attract pressure.
“The objective is to move the opponent, not the ball.” (Guardiola)
Another way to attract pressure were backwards passes. They are also often a pressing trigger for many opponents, as the ball moves away from the goal. Barcelona strategically used backwards passes, to pull the opponent higher and then make use of the opened space either in between the lines or in behind. It was from major importance that Barcelona constantly provided back pass options, to achieve this aim (relay player). Barcelona then often created a dynamical advantage with runs in behind, as the opponent just moved up or was moving up, while a player made a run in the opposite direction.
Strategically playing wide to attract pressure and then playing back inside into the opened space, was another way, which was already discussed in the build-up section.
Another way to attract pressure was through dribbling. The central players had an incredible dribbling ability, which Barcelona regularly used. The likes of Messi and Iniesta continuously waved through defences and attracted various opponents. This in turn obviously opened spaces somewhere else.
Furthermore, the overload alone could attract pressure and force the opponent to leave more players in this area. Barcelona then often combined in these small spaces to attract even more pressure and eventually played to the opened space.
Attracting pressure is also necessary for a successful switch, something I’ll touch on more later.
As already mentioned, Barcelona wanted to progress through the middle. Besides attracting pressure, the movements and combinations by the central players were key, to achieve this intention.
To begin with, Messi and Fabregas regularly rotated vertically. At times, Fabregas moved into the striker position, when Messi dropped deeper. This could pin the opponent’s centre backs and therefore open more space for Messi to operate. However, Messi and Fabregas could also drop deep or stay higher up at the same time. As already mentioned, it was very fluid in the midfield and the players had a lot of freedom to move around.
Another vertical rotation, which often occurred was between an 8 and Messi/Fabregas (depending on how was positioned on the last line). Messi or Fabregas could drop deep, which often pulled a centre back out of position, opening space in behind. An 8 (especially Iniesta) could exploit this opened gap with a run in behind.
Barcelona also regularly used horizontal rotations. One has already been mentioned: 8 dropping wide and winger moving inside. Another one occurred when Messi or Fabregas dropped wide. Then, the ball-near winger could overtake their central position, to balance and potentially unsettle the opponent.
Dynamical space occupation and fluidity were some other big aspects in Barcelona’s offensive play. Sometimes, players could overtake positions with rotations, as just mentioned, or positions were left unoccupied temporarily. The central players were in constant movement. The intention behind every run was to open spaces, exploit spaces or be accessible as a support option.
These movements were very difficult to defend, as the opponent is usually more static. Moreover, it was especially effective against man-orientations. The opponent constantly had to decide between following every movement or handing over. This was a difficult task to handle. Against more zonal orientations, Barcelona was able to create overloads and combine through there.
The central players constantly looked to position themselves on various horizontal and vertical lines. This led to the creation of triangles and diamonds, which eventually resulted in diagonal passing lanes. Diagonal passes in the attacking phase are key in football. One major advantage compared to vertical passes is that the receiver has a better body position to progress. Moreover, diagonal passes both lead to space gain as well as a switch of the point of attack.
This positioning on various horizontal and vertical lines also helped the Barcelona players to combine effectively and was very important at counterpressing, something I’ll go more into depth later.
It was beautiful to watch, how the central players constantly moved intelligently into open spaces. For example, against the dynamics of the opponent or on the blind-side.
Especially, after a pass was played, the Barcelona players immediately looked to position themselves into new open spaces. One-two’s were very common and extremely difficult to defend due to the high tempo.
Judah Davies on the effectiveness of one-two’s in his article on spielverlagerung.com:
“With the ball’s location moving at the same time as the opponent’s, the defenders’ main visual reference points are effectively being split. For this reason it is not possible for them to act on both simultaneously. Focusing on the ball alone risks leaving the opponent free to run behind them, whilst focusing solely on the opponent may mean not being able to track the direction of the return pass.” (Davies)
As mentioned a couple of times now, the central players constantly looked to position themselves in open spaces. This was mostly in between the lines or in between opponents (a very important aspect of positional play). This mere positioning was very beneficial for Barcelona, as it created positional superiority. It often created a dilemma for the opponent on who should mark the player in between the lines or if even one should mark him. When a defender moved up to mark the Barcelona player in between the lines, spaces would open somewhere else, which Barcelona regularly found due to their amazing structure. When no one decided to mark the Barcelona player in between the lines, he could turn and make use of the space with a dribble for example.
An example of the positioning in the boxes and its potential effects:
When Barcelona eventually found a player (free man) in between the lines, there were various possibilities to progress from there and eventually create chances. The first one was dribbling forwards. This was mostly used when the player had time and space. The dribble was usually very difficult to defend as the opponents often didn’t know how to react to it. Moreover, it could attract pressure and open space somewhere else to exploit.
An amazing explanation from Judah Davies’ article on spielverlagerung.com about the effects of dribbling when receiving the ball, against man-marking:
“If the dribble is not pressured, the ball carrier can just dribble all the way to the goal. If the dribble is pressured, at least one opponent will vacate their marking assignment in the process, this should open a passing option to progress. When a defender leaves the opponent they were marking to press the ball, they usually attempt to press whilst using their cover shadow, to prevent the pass to the opponent they just moved away from. As such, advancing beyond this point, requires manipulation of cover shadows. One way of doing this is through continued dribbling. When a defender presses whilst using their cover shadow, they often slow down as they aim to maintain their position in the lane between the ball and the opponent they aim to cover. As such, they can be vulnerable to a change of pace from the dribbler which can allow the attacker to advance and/or bypass the cover shadow, opening the lane to the previously covered opponent.” (Davies)
Another way to progress further up and create a chance, after a player received in between the lines, were runs in behind by other players. The ball-carrier could then possibly play in behind to these runners, who were often difficult to defend, as the opponent had to focus on both the ball and the runner. Additionally, a run in behind could also possibly act as a decoy, pulling a defender away and opening more spaces for the ball-carrier or spaces somewhere else to exploit.
A further option to progress from the free player was to combine through. Even though, the distances were very small most of the time, the Barcelona players were amazing at quick combinations and constantly made clever movements to keep the attack flowing and support each other. The overload in the middle also played a big role there.
Another option was to play wide to a winger after receiving the ball in the middle in between the lines. The winger often had a lot of space wide, as the centre was compressed due to the higher number of Barcelona players. He could take on 1v1s wide (qualitative superiority), cross inside or open space inside and play back again in the middle.
Generally, it was very important that when a player received in between the lines, he was supported sufficiently. The Barcelona players naturally constantly looked to provide back pass/safety options for the player in possession. This allowed the ball-carrier to get out of the pressure. Furthermore, Barcelona was then able to play out of crowded zones and access less crowded zones.
It depended on the situation and where the player received the ball in between the lines, which option to progress was used.
Another aspect in Barcelona’s offensive play, which shouldn’t be neglected is that the individual technical quality by the central players was world-class. They didn’t need much space to operate. Therefore, Barcelona could regularly play risky passes to players in central areas, who had little time or were even under pressure. The receiver often chose the best option to progress or could beat his direct opponent, for example with a clever first touch against the dynamics of the defender.
A big reason why these line-breaking passes weren’t too risky was because of Barcelona’s outstanding counterpressing.
Barcelona immediately looked to win the ball back, right after they lost it. One important aspect that made it so successful was that every player had the willingness to not turn off after a ball loss, but rather transition to win the ball back instantly. Additionally, the small distances and overload in the midfield was also significant. A good counterpressing is always determined by the structure in possession. The positioning on various horizontal and vertical lines made it possible to control the space around the ball effectively after a ball loss. The opponent was usually guided wide due to the high number of players in the midfield. This was less dangerous for Barcelona, as the way to the goal is farer from the wings than from the centre, giving the Catalans more time to defend.
A suitable quote by Cruyff on the small distances in possession from Barcelona and counterpressing:
“Do you know how Barcelona win the ball back so quickly? It’s because they don’t have to run back more than 10 metres as they never pass the ball more than 10 metres.” (Cruyff)
Moreover, Barcelona could transfer their dynamics in the attack to the counterpressing situation. Often, when a team wins the ball, it takes a few seconds for the ball-carrier to orient himself in a more or less static situation. The Barcelona players then had a dynamical advantage due to their movements in the attacking phase and could win the ball back.
Usually, the nearest player(s) looked to put the ball-carrier under pressure, while the other players around the ball looked to control the space, using their cover-shadow to possibly cut passing lanes. The farer players also tried to compress the space around the ball, to make a counterattack even more difficult for the opponent. For example, the halfbacks also often applied aggressive countermarking.
I’ve mentioned earlier that when a winger received wide, he could cross inside. However, as the central players from Barcelona were all fairly small, the Catalans used these situations to counterpress. A lot of players often positioned themselves around the penalty area to control the space there and get the ball back after a potential clearance from the opponent.
When Barcelona eventually won the ball back, they mostly used it to circulate the ball and start a new controlled attack. However, there were also times when they immediately transitioned forward to create a chance. Most opponents are disorganized in these situations, which can be used to one’s advantage.
As mentioned earlier, Barcelona often used 3rd man combinations during the build-up phase. Additionally, the Catalans also regularly used 3rd man runs to create chances.
Judah Davies explains here, why 3rd man runs are so effective:
“With their focus on the ball carrier and the ‘2nd man’ the 3rd man’s movements are not prioritised or prepared for. This means the 3rd man’s initial actions are out of the immediate perception of the defenders.” (Davies)
Generally, the Barcelona forwards used a lot of blind-side runs to get in behind unnoticed. They usually started their run directly after the opponent scanned. Additionally, these players were usually positioned ball-far. Ball-far players are less dangerous for the opponent and therefore less focused one. Barcelona often made use of this fact and played diagonal balls in behind to these runners.
It was often a trigger for the forwards to make runs in behind when a player received with space and looked up. The runners preferably made runs on the blind-side of their opponent, but just runs in behind timed perfectly with the passer were extremely difficult to defend as well.
As already mentioned, Barcelona used a lot of switches in their offensive play. The goal was always to move the opponent and force him to make as many decisions as possible that he will mess up sooner or later. Especially the concept of “overload to isolate” was used regularly. The goal was usually at first to progress through this overload. However, if that wasn’t possible, Barcelona would switch the play to less crowded zones or to a winger in a 1v1 situation.
It was important that Barcelona prepared the switch accordingly. To successfully change the point of attack, it’s important to attract pressure first on one side to open spaces on the other side. How Barcelona provoked pressure was already discussed above.
The structure in possession was also very important for their switches. The Barcelona players supported the ball-carrier very well and always provided back pass options, which would allow Barcelona to change the point of attack.
Half-space to half-space switches, a special form of switches, were also very important in Barcelona’s attacking game. Again, starting with provoking pressure from the opponent in one half-space, to then switch to the other.
Rene Maric explained in his article about the half-spaces, why half-space switches are so effective:
“A shift from one half-space to the other offers several different perspectives and is the ideal intersection of a great number of strategic factors. The ball does not traverse only one zone (ie from midfield to the half-space or from the half-space to the near wing), which wouldn’t require the opposing defense to move much; or three zones (from the half-space to the far wing or vice versa) or more (wing to wing), which would give the opponent too much time to adjust to be truly effective. The time component of the pass length on the opponent’s movement is not adversely affected by direct half-space shifts. The passer and the receiver are close enough to be able to play a flat or at least chipped pass, which is not difficult to handle or play with precision. Furthermore, the opponent must move quickly or gaps will form that can be used for vertical passes to the strikers.” (Maric)
Generally, the switches were preferred through the block, as the distance is shorter and could attract even more pressure. However, that wasn’t always possible.
Most opponents obviously knew that Barcelona preferred to progress through the centre and had their best players there. Therefore, the opponents usually tried to restrict central progression and the Catalans in turn often had to progress and create chances through the wings.
The central overload could open spaces wide automatically, when the opponent tried to match numbers in the centre or make central progression impossible. Therefore, Barcelona could play wide to their wingers, who could use their individual dribbling abilities to beat their opponents in 1v1 situations.
The wingers also often made clever double movements to get in behind. Starting with a short dropping movement, to pull the opponent deep and then suddenly changing direction to attack the opened space in behind.
As already often mentioned, wing support was very important to progress back inside and make use of possibly opened space there. However, sometimes, the players looked to position themselves farer away from a ball-carrier on the wing, to open more spaces for him to use his individual ability and beat his opponent. It always depended on the situation if wing support or no wing support was applied.
Conclusion
The Barcelona of 2011/12 will go down as one of the best in history. Every Barcelona team managed by Pep Guardiola was a little bit different. However, this side was the most unique one. The game was based on fluidity and the players had a lot of freedom.
Every game showed the individual qualities of these Barcelona players in finding and creating spaces. The players could move around a lot, but still mostly chose the right decision, which was fascinating to watch. Everything was so free-flowing, and it looked like that the players never did anything different in their life than passing the ball and moving into space.
I hope I was able to give you a good insight into the tactics of this Barcelona side that made them so special. Feedback is appreciated in any form whatsoever!
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