Notes from the Sidelines, №13: The Rise of Rodrigo Duterte in 2016 and Bong Go’s Path to the Presidency
Notes from the Sidelines №12: The 2016 Rise of Rodrigo Duterte and Bong Go’s Path to the Presidency.
I ended my last article with Rodrigo Duterte as Mayor in 1988.[1] I pointed out how colonial authority, migration patterns, and a general sense of chaos and hopelessness in Davao City led to Duterte’s decades-long reign. I found that an inquiry into the making of Davao City as crucial to Duterte’s entry into politics. Equally as important is the path he took to Malacanang, and how Bong Go will probably aim to replicate it.
There have been many theories of Duterte’s rise to power such as: Duterte as “subversive” vote of the masses against the elite; Duterte as “penal populism”. But whenever I read these theories, it feels like they are each looking at one facet of a larger puzzle.
It’s comparable to the story of the blind men and the elephant. One put his hand on the body and thought it was a wall; another touched the trunk and thought it was a snake; and the last touched the tip of the tail and thought it was a fan. All of them made correct observations, but their conclusions only captured certain elements of the elephant.
My favorite theory of Duterte’s rise is from a mentor, whom I shall call “Bigfoot” (a reference to Anthony Bourdain’s “Kitchen Confidential”) who had contacts in the Duterte campaign. He said that the Duterte campaign could be best compared to childbirth. Childbirth not in the sense that Candidate Duterte was bloody and screaming all the time, but in the sense of a trimestral campaign.
According to this theory, Duterte’s marketing as a candidate could be divided into three images: Duterte as a Regional Candidate; Duterte as a “Law and Order” Candidate; and Duterte as a Man of the Masses.
First, Duterte as a Regional Candidate. Rodrigo was not the first Presidential aspirant who sought to invade the throne in Manila through an offensive from the South. That honor belongs to Emilio Osmena (and running mate Ismael Sueno) in 1998.
Look at the map above. Osmena polled impressively in Cebu, Bohol, Leyte, Zamboanga del Norte and Bukidnon. He ran under the PROMDI (a Filipinized version of “FROM THE” referring to someone “from the” countryside)
That Duterte’s campaign had regionalism in its strategy is clear. Duterte (and now Isko) advisor Banayo admitted as such in a forum on 13 October 2021.
And as I wrote in my article[2] on the formation of modern Davao City, regional movements from the 1900’s to 1940’s led to a migration of Bisaya migrants in Mindanao, particularly Davao. Vicente Duterte and his family moved from Danao to Mindanao in 1948.
What is more interesting is how they courted and consolidated that regional vote. In this article[3] by Banayo, he writes that the first of the campaign was to go on a “learning tour” of key provinces in the South:
“Bebot (Alvarez), Sonny Dominguez, Bingbong Medialdea, Bong Go and this writer were closeted at the executive board room of Marco Polo Hotel in Davao City with then Mayor Digong from 9 in the evening of January 7 until midnight, then proceeded to the bar downstairs for further talks that stretched till 2 in the morning of January 8, 2015.
Together, we got the mayor’s approval of a plan to go on a “learning tour” (Sonny Dominguez’ term for the testing the waters’ pre-campaign) while in the Marco Polo board room. Then and there, we agreed to launch Duterte’s tour January 23 in Butuan City, at my family’s events place, and Bong Go called Gov. Angel Amante Matba to assist at inviting key sectoral leaders in Butuan and Agusan del Norte.
After Butuan, we lined up Pagadian in Zamboanga del Sur and Puerto Princesa in Palawan, thence Cebu City, the heartland of the Visayas in the home province of the Duterte family. All these destinations were decided upon that fateful evening.”
Banayo’s claim is partially validated. on 14 Feb 2015, Duterte was in the Dipolog City stop of his “listening tour” of Federalism, “a popular advocacy among sectors in the south that have been so tired of being neglected by imperial Manila.”
Then in April 2015, Duterte was in Mindanao State University in Iligan City, where talked about Federalism and the Mindanao peace process. He also showed a nuanced understanding of Mindanao dynamics. Duterte’s message here being “Only a Mindanaoan can address the Mindanao peace process”.
Soon, Digong in Cebu, talking in Bisaya about how Tagalogs are Manila-centric.[4] This also helped distinguish him from the bevy of Ilonggo candidates at the time.
The impact of Duterte’s regional base and regional message was outstanding. With the exception of 5 provinces and 4 cities, Mindanao voted overwhelmingly for Duterte, delivering 6.12 million votes. Cebu, on the other hand, delivered an outstanding 1.4 million votes. While Duterte didn’t win in all of the Visayas, his win in Cebu helped offset Mar Roxas’ inherent advantage among Panay and Neg Occidental voters.[5]
But as was seen in the case of Emilio Osmena in 1998, a purely regional candidacy is not enough to win the Presidency. As such, Duterte had to expand his voter base by making inroads to Luzon through phase 2 of his campaign: the “law and order” candidate. This is the Duterte of “My God I hate drugs” and who vowed to end drugs and crime in “3 to 6 months”. Duterte dug deep into what Professor Nicole Curato called “latent anxieties”, e.g., fears that did not necessarily manifest in the surveys but which linger in the back of voters’ minds.
As I’ve noted before, Duterte’s tearing away of the Greater Manila vote away from the main Luzon landmass was extraordinary. And that’s the same vote that Isko is trying to claim.[6]
“3 to 6 months” was Duterte’s trojan horse. But why was it so effective? It’s partially tied to the authoritarian personality of certain voters in crime-riddled Metro Manila- the same that leads to “law and order” candidates like Lacson and Alfredo Lim.[7]
The historical reasons of how this demographic formed are too lengthy to discuss here. It will be discussed in part 2 of my BBM article. But suffice to say, it has to do with the transfer of authoritarian traits from one generation to another. Note that BBM performed very well in Greater Manila in 2016, and he dominated NCR and Balance of Luzon in the last Pulse Survey (September 6–11). Better, in fact, that “Greater Manila” candidate Isko.
It should also be noted that Duterte had already achieved a degree of notoriety in Luzon. As I noted in the Lacson article, Duterte was a household name with a resident in Las Pinas in 2008 who believed that “Mayor Duterte… is what the country needs”.
In 2002, Mayor Duterte made it to Time Magazine. The article notes that Duterte was so well-known then that Ramos and Erap tried to get him to run for a national post; Alfred Lim was an admirer; copycat vigilantes even cropped up in Digos City and CDO.
And of course, there were the stories about Duterte, the Mayor of distant Davao, who would patrol his city on a motorbike at night, who once fed a cigarette to a foreign tourist who violated a no-smoking ordinance.[8]
In other words, Rodrigo Duterte was a MEME, in Richard Dawkins’ original concept: “a unit of cultural transmission, or a unit of imitation”. Or perhaps a unit of perverse admiration- one which percolated among Authoritarian Filipinos seeking someone to gravitate around after the fall of Marcos.
The final phase of Duterte’s trimestral campaign was the Digong as a “man of the masses”. In this aspect, Duterte was a perfect copy of the 1998 populism of Erap Estrada.
A paper by Marco Garrido explains the tactics and politics of populism in appealing to the masses. The populism of the Estrada and Duterte variant “…consists of tactics such as an antielite line and the flouting of
social conventions.”
But tactics are not enough. There has to be an element of recognition. Poor Filipinos must feel that populist candidates actually listen to them. Which is why the Erap/Duterte brand worked, but the Villar style of “populism” (while also being a millionaire) did not work.
Just a note here- many Leni supporters are defending her from charges of elitism by pointing out that she has actual programs for the poor. It may be just as important for her campaign to build an image of her as someone who “listens” and is “sincere”.
To go back to the Serge article[9], solidifying that “nakikinig” theme and isolating it will be crucial for the endearment phase of the 4 “pro poor” candidates- Isko, Pacman, Leni.
Going back to Duterte. All of those “vile” traits- the cursing, womanizing, the refusal to wear formal clothes- that “disente” voters hated were crucial tactics for Duterte to get the masa vote.
The more we recoiled in horror at Duterte’s antics, the more his poor supporters backed him: Garrido writes:
“Regular experiences of discrimination instill feelings of shame, timidity, anxiety, and unworthiness in situations of class interaction… Acts negating that sense of stigma, therefore, extract a sense of debt and inspire feelings of affection, including love and devotion.”
You know how we internet-savvy, middle to upper class voters love the phrase “You are valid”? That’s what populists like Duterte (in 2016) and Estrada (in 1998) are able to conjure. And it’s a powerful, deep-seated emotion. Today’s candidates can learn from it without necessarily embracing it wholesale.
Those were the three faces of Duterte in 2016. How are these factors in play this 2022? For starters, his ratings have dropped to +52- the lowest since the good +45 in June 2018. And while it is still astonishingly high, the drop in NCR and Luzon is notable.
This means that Luzon may be wide open for one of the candidates. Obviously, the current beneficiary is BBM. Pero marami pa pwedeng mangyari. But the problem is, if BBM’s ratings in Luzon do fall, will Bong Go benefit?
Electorally speaking, Bong Go is a peculiar creature. I cannot remember anyone else whose prior political career as Executive Secretary, Secretary to the Cabinet, and Head of the PMS (which was essentially BG’s role with additions) led to national office.
Those are not politically visible offices. Two other politicians made the leap from those posts to national office: Joker Arroyo and Franklin Drilon. But these guys took their own detours before heading to the Senate. On one hand, Joker Arroyo served as the Representative for the then-lone district of Makati City and had a starring role in the impeachment trial of Joseph Estrada. On the other hand, Franklin Drilon served in three cabinet offices (DOLE, DOJ, Executive Secretary) of at least two Presidents (Aquino and Ramos).
In contrast, Bong Go took a direct path from being Special Assistant to the President to the Senate (some say “Senatorial Assistant to the President”). Therefore, we need to enter into a Bong Go’s campaign rhetoric in 2019 to see how he won (and how he might win again).
For starters, Duterte’s endorsement of Go was obviously a huge factor. In 2019, former aide Bong Go won 5.34 million votes from Mindanao- close to the 6.12 million votes for Duterte in 2016. This was re-emphasized in the phrase “Tulay kay Pangulo”- he was the one who would do the “listening” for Duterte. Bong Go was also branded as “Kuya”- a familial term consistent with Duterte as “Tatay Digong”.
Bong Go’s status as the “right hand” also gave him unprecedented visibility when giving out aid to typhoon and fire victims. If there was a fire, BG was probably there, giving aid. In this way, he resembles the “tao” or “person in charge” of local government units.
Bong Go’s Malasakit Centers were also probably a huge factor. Today there are 147 of these facilities across the country, and I’m sure he was present every time one was inaugurated. And as SAP, Bong Go was the primary point of contact of Local Government officials who wanted to build an infrastructure project in their jurisdiction. He had the hand on the tap, and spigot was overflowing. In return, LGU officials pledged their support to him.
Of course, most of BG’s speeches in 2019 always highlighted the infrastructure projects which he “delivered” to the province, or on projects which he pledged he would deliver.
If you look at Bong Go’s first TV ad, the emphasis is on infrastructure: “Highway, train, tulay.” And on goods and services which he will continue to deliver as President Duterte’s successor: “Bakuna , Ayuda, …Malasakit Centers”. The war on drugs gets a passing mention.
In summary, how will the right hand (Bong Go) win as the successor of the Iron Fist (Duterte)? First, he will be crowned as the successor of President Duterte, which will give him an advantage in recreating the Solid South of 2016. Although this may be countered by Sara Duterte’s tandem with BBM, as well as Manny Pacquiao’s hometown advantage in Sarangani and General Santos.
Second, as the administration candidate, he has access to government resources, which he can “offer” to Filipino voters, either as direct aid (ayuda) or as promises for the future. The right hand is also the hand that feeds.
He also has what remains of PDP-Laban. But it should be noted that political machinery and access to government resources as the primary campaign strategy are effective only when elections are close (e.g., Ramos in 1992 and GMA in 2004).
This is probably why Digong immediately activated the bully pulpit on BBM- to take down the frontrunner, and to bring the elections to a dead heat. In such a scenario, machinery and government resources can be a factor.
Last but not least: what better way to prop-up an “anti-drugs” candidate by spreading rumors of a candidate with drug abuse problems?
[1] https://medium.com/@lucian.dioneda/notes-from-the-sidelines-11-a-pit-stop-in-davao-city-b8db9dc93db3
[2] Ibid.
[3] https://manilastandard.net/opinion/columns/so-i-see-by-lito-banayo/344248/the-leader-we-need-in-2022.html
[4]https://www.rappler.com/nation/elections/rodrigo-duterte-cebu-visayan-president
[5] https://cebudailynews.inquirer.net/93327/cebu-delivers-1-4-m-votes-for-duterte
[6] https://medium.com/@lucian.dioneda/notes-from-the-sidelines-8-greater-manila-and-isko-morenos-precarious-path-to-the-presidency-be7881dc009a
[7] https://medium.com/@lucian.dioneda/notes-from-the-sidelines-9-panfilo-ping-lacson-and-a-portrait-of-the-policeman-as-president-fd4dfb044929
[8] https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/insider/legends-myths-violence-president-duterte-davao.html
[9] https://medium.com/@lucian.dioneda/notes-from-the-sidelines-5-how-serge-osme%C3%B1a-markets-a-candidate-e50d5a2980e7
