EU on easing the opening of bank accounts for anti-Putins
EU lawmakers on easing the opening of bank accounts and obtaining visas for Russian opposition
The European Parliament adopted a resolution in connection with the murder of Alexey Navalny. It openly questions the legitimacy of Vladimir Putin as the president of Russia — which raises the question of creating an independent service for online voting by Russians outside Russia and within the country. It’s impossible to win elections against Putin (and Lukashenko), who organizes and counts by himself — a service like Change.org is needed, (only with full KYC at the level of opening bank accounts in digital banks in the UK, Europe, and the USA).In this context, if Navalny himself were still alive — he wouldn’t need to participate in elections organized by Putin, he needed to conduct his own elections. But he didn’t have time.
The European Parliament calls on EU member states to expand and simplify the program of issuing humanitarian visas for Russian human rights defenders, democratic activists, and independent journalists who face political persecution.
It calls for simplifying the processes for Russian dissidents to register organizations and legal entities in the EU, open bank accounts, and carry out other administrative needs so that they can continue their work in exile. “For the first time, the resolution mentions the problem with bank accounts. Supporting Russian political prisoners and civil society, the problems with opening accounts for those who were forced to leave Russia — this was not previously officially recorded by the European Parliament. This is an important step that will help us move forward,” said Petar Tanev, a freelance advisor to the Bulgarian delegation to the European Parliament and consultant for the Free Russia Foundation, who participated in the promotion of the resolution project.
Earlier EU lawmakers suggested issuing special passports to Russians who disagree with the war. Four MEPs (Andrius Kubilius from Lithuania, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz from Poland, Bernard Guetta from France and Sergey Lagodinsky from Germany) have prepared a draft report with recommendations on political relations between the EU and Russians. The document notes the importance of cooperation and support for the Russian democratic opposition and proposes to create “passports of democracy” and special visa conditions for representatives of the opposition and civil society. Such passports should allow Russians to stay and work safely in EU member states for the period of expulsion from Russia.
Sergey Lagodinsky advocated for it to be precisely a resolution. There was some discussion about the title of the resolution — clearly, the main emphasis should be made on the fact of Navalny’s murder, but it was necessary to understand what to do next with Russian political prisoners who continue to sit in prisons and with civil society, which is subjected to repression, about the problems of which Yulia Navalnaya spoke in her speech to the Council of Ministers of the EU. For MEPs, Navalny’s murder became a kind of trigger — they started paying more attention to the problems of civil society in Russia, and the need for a new EU support approach, as seen in the resolution.
“The European Parliament expresses support for Yulia Navalnaya in her endeavor to continue the work started by her husband — and the Anti-Corruption Foundation founded by Alexey Navalny.” EU lawmakers suggested issuing special passports to Russians who disagree with the war. The “passports of democracy” may be put into circulation as early as next year. Four MEPs have prepared a draft report with recommendations on political relations between the EU and Russians. The document notes the importance of cooperation and support for the Russian democratic opposition and proposes to create “passports of democracy” and special visa conditions for representatives of the opposition and civil society. Such passports should allow Russians to stay and work safely in EU member states for the period of expulsion from Russia.
Final approval of the report by the European Parliament is scheduled for March 2024. The emergence of “passports of democracy” is quite likely, says Petar Tanev. “There is no regulatory framework for the creation of a new passport yet, but it may be introduced on the basis of special visa procedures and agreements between EU member states as a start. I think such a step could well be taken after the 2024 elections. And the new EU Migration Pact, which will improve the asylum procedure, may facilitate this,” says Tanev. And there are historical examples: in 1922, Russian emigrants in Europe began to be issued Nansen passports. The document was designed to make life easier for people fleeing repression and red terror.
Yulia Navalnaya wrote in The Washington Post: she called on the West not to recognize the results of elections in Russia, not to recognize Putin himself as the legitimate head of state. “Putin seized power in Russia, …it is essential to support the forces that continue to resist from within Russia.” “Do not believe that everyone in Russia supports Putin and his war. Russia is under a harsh dictatorship.” “I call on political leaders of the West to help all Russian citizens who stand up against Putin’s gang. I urge you to finally hear the voice of free Russia and take a principled stand against him.”
The Kremlin wants Russians to associate the size of the country with its strength and prestige. However, in the modern world, a country’s size does not guarantee its economic prosperity or political power (and at some point, territorial expansion becomes colonialism). The Kremlin plans to pursue Russians who speak out against the war worldwide. Freedom House mentioned in its report back in 2021 that Russia conducts “aggressive transnational repressive activities” abroad. At that time, human rights defenders noted that tools such as Interpol searches, surveillance, and hacking attacks are used against individuals the Kremlin perceives as threats to its security. Safe countries for Russians who publicly oppose the war in Ukraine are those with democratic procedures and practices: the European Union, the USA, Australia, Japan. In all other countries, there are risks for Russian citizens. Particular caution should be exercised in countries bordering Russia, where local law enforcement may detain a Russian and transport them to the border to hand them over to Russian special services or other state bodies.
Navalny turned out to be Hari Seldon
As Isaac Asimov wrote in “Foundation”: “Ironically, political struggle, revolutions, wars — all these are signs of life. And now — there’s a kind of universal fatigue. Everything is calm — but not because people are happy, but because they are tired and have given up.”
A year ago, my friend Alex recommended the book Rutger Bregman ‘s “Utopia for Realists” to me, and I discussed with him a compelling essay by another Alex — about the (crisis of) political imagination.
“Utopia for Realists” discusses several ideas aimed at creating a more just and prosperous society. The main point is the importance of utopian thinking (political imagination, the ability to dream): Bregman argues that to achieve significant social progress, one must be able to dream and envision a better future, not being afraid to propose ideas that seem unattainable. The author criticizes the current economic (capitalist) system for its inability to solve social and environmental problems, as well as for contributing to the growth of inequality and worsening working conditions. One of the central themes of the book is the introduction of a universal basic income, providing everyone with a fixed amount of money regardless of their work or social status. The author argues that this could solve many social problems, including poverty, inequality, and lack of motivation to work. Bregman discusses the idea of significantly reducing working hours (a 15-hour workweek), which, in his opinion, would allow people to spend more time with their families, rest, and personal growth. The book makes an argument for open borders (borderless country, metastate) and free movement of people around the world, emphasizing that it is not only ethically correct but also economically beneficial for countries.
In the context of this book and this essay, I believed that Alexey Navalny’s main contribution was that he, with a very unobstructed creative view of the world and design thinking, constantly challenged commonly accepted political norms, developed our political imagination and ability to dream, and explored new realms of possibility. Let it be my words of gratitude to Alexey for giving us all hope and the ability to dream for so long.
Navalny wrote once: “The fight should not be solely against the fact that Russia is unfree, but that it is unhappy in all aspects. We have everything — yet we are an unhappy country. Open any Russian literature — it’s all descriptions of misery and suffering. And we can’t break out of this cycle, but we want to. Therefore, the slogan needs to change — Russia should be not only free but also happy. Russia will be happy. That’s it.” “Prison [exists] in one’s mind,” Navalny wrote from his cell in 2021. “And if you think carefully, I am not in prison but on a space voyage…to a wonderful new world.” [That voyage ended on February 16th.]
Honestly, I only got around to reading this gem from 2010 back in early 2013. I remember popping over to Tony’s at Zappos HQ in June 2013, where I bumped into Jenn Lim. We hit it off and kept in touch now and then. Then Tony Hsieh passed away, which really stung and left a hole inside me, — and now Alexey’s gone too. I’m not sure if he ever got into Tony’s work, but I remember gifting him this book. It’s such a gripping tale about the journey of an entrepreneur, filled with this incredible energy and vibe. The book dives deep into the importance of culture over pure business — how shared values among employees and meeting the intellectual, spiritual, and aesthetic needs of customers can be more crucial than chasing profits.
For the first few years, the company was in the red, struggling to streamline its operations. In a bid to cut costs, Tony once suggested moving to Las Vegas since it was cheaper in terms of office rent, salaries, etc. This willingness to relocate and start fresh became a core part of Zappos’ culture, making its people more adaptable and ready to venture out of their comfort zones. And that’s something I ponder about with Navalny too. It’s not just about how many are ‘for’ or ‘against’ Putin; it’s more about the sheer number of people who’d rather not shake things up or step out of their safety bubble.
Alex Zamyatin vividly wrote in March 2023 about Alexey Navalny’s essay “15 Points for a Citizen of Russia Who Wishes Well for Their Country,” in which he outlined a broad platform for people with anti-war views: “Can the opposition’s brightest minds not unite into a think tank and finally devise a plan to lead the country out of dictatorship and towards prosperity? Why is this task being undertaken by a single politician, currently under harsh prison conditions?
A political program is usually understood to be a list of specific state policy measures. The vision or project of the future is something more general, an ideal of how society and power should be organized, towards which we aim. A pragmatically thinking person might say: without a concrete program, any imagined ideal remains a useless (or even dangerous) utopia [- but] this is false pragmatism, built on a mistaken understanding of the role of visions of the future in politics.
To gain support, politicians and movements must make a clear proposal to citizens. However, paradoxically, demanding a program in the form of a “business plan” is often a symptom of apoliticalness, not political discernment.
The rapid decline in people’s interest in politics as such suggests that voters do not behave as rational consumers. It turns out that the vast majority of citizens in liberal democracies do not feel they can genuinely influence power. The more politics resembles a market, the stronger the indifference and distrust of citizens towards conventional forms of political participation. In response to the “unfulfilled promises of democracy” and the crisis of representation, populist movements have emerged, refusing to compete on programmatic grounds and simply demanding the dismantling of the entire system as too detached from the people.
When a person does not want to engage in political discussion and rebuffs agitation with the words “give me a concrete program, I’ll study it myself,” they are likely just finding a formal excuse to opt out of political participation while maintaining the facade of a rational citizen. Behind the mask of impartial calculativeness in these cases lies simple apoliticalness.
But if we want to work towards building a Beautiful Russia of the Future, we cannot do without an ideal image of the goal for which we strive. Indeed, in ordinary labor, its goal must exist from the beginning of the process. In politics, everything is complicated by the fact that the object of labor is ourselves as participants in one community or another, so the goal here cannot emerge before getting to know and interact with others, that is, before the political activity itself.
This is the key to understanding the nature of future political projects. It all starts with our desire for political changes, bearing in mind certain ideals and beliefs (about freedom, equality, justice, etc.). Then we begin to act collectively, guided by these ideals, and only in the process of this activity do we form our notions of specific goals. This reverses the whole scheme of ordinary labor, where a person knows in advance what they want to achieve and begins action with a ready image in their mind.
We know we want a peaceful, free, democratic (each can continue for themselves) Russia, and that is enough to engage in political struggle for it. But how exactly such a Russia should be organized is something we can only learn in the political process itself. Trying to find a project of the future that will tell us in advance how to act is putting the cart before the horse.
Influential German thinker Max Weber wrote that “all historical experience confirms that what was possible could not have been achieved if the world had not repeatedly reached for the impossible.” Half a century later, the slogan of the Paris May 1968 “Be realistic — demand the impossible!” echoed him.
While political leaders and intellectuals, for objective reasons, cannot create space for political actions, they can engage in another important task — the development of political imagination. This is far more useful than it might seem at first glance. The thing is, as a result of years of depolitization, normative reasoning has almost disappeared from our socio-political sphere: we have unlearned how to speak and think about how society and power should be organized and what a good life actually means. Instead, we have focused on cynically guessing what will “actually” happen, i.e., what the elites will do.
In Russia, discussions on how we want to live are considered naive dreaming, utopianism. In such cases, it’s said that “one needs to be a realist.” [] However, this is a known mental trap: we attribute greater probability to events that are easier for us to imagine. The more impoverished our political imagination (i.e., the harder it is for us to imagine a different socio-political order), the lower we assess the possibility of achieving it. Consequently, we do less for our own better future, impoverishing our practice and thereby depleting our political imagination. This vicious cycle benefits those who gain from the status quo, so the most consistent realists are people in power and privileged elites.
Developing political imagination implies that we can critically look at the existing frameworks of our notions and ponder what world we would indeed like to eventually obtain. For example, we can move away from discussions about who will replace Putin in his position — and try to imagine Russia without a president at the head of the state. In this regard, the suggestion to think about a parliamentary republic is already very useful. Other obvious directions for developing political imagination — self-governance, social justice, ecology — should also return to the agenda.
The good news is that, as Karl Marx wrote, “humanity always sets itself only such tasks as it can solve, since closer examination will always show that the task itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution already exist or are at least in the process of formation.”
To achieve this, firstly, one needs to open up to normative political philosophy and take seriously those who have already thought about a better future before you [like Navalny]. And secondly, what is even more important, it is necessary to sometimes look around and pay attention to successful examples of self-organization, even at the most local level.”
A Beautiful Russia of the Future’ Chief Believer
In this context, I proposed to Navalny three days before his demise, and his team, to stop thinking about a specific Russia on the map and that there’s no need to win elections against Putin — one must invent their own Russia (or not even Russia), and organize their own elections.
Navalny and other oppositionists do not need to try to win elections against Putin and Co — I believe it’s a waste of energy and resources, as it’s their game, by their rules (not by law), and therefore it’s unwinnable. Create your own game and your own rules — unite your supporters, both within Russia and abroad, realize that there are many of us, hold your own elections! Like change.org, but with full KYC (to enter the legal field and) according to the standards of the UK, EU, and USA — for recognition by the international community.
More than a million Russians left after the start of the war with Ukraine — according to recent news, the state will try to prevent and not consider the votes of Russians abroad. But how many Russians inside and outside the country are, if not “for Navalny,” then at least “against Putin and his war with Ukraine”? Enough surely for the population of a quite large European country. Propagandists constantly try to convince us that we are few and we are “various minorities,” lumpens, counter-culturists, seceders, renegades, — and we buy into it. So how many of us are there? I’m sure far more than we’re afraid to imagine. This, incidentally, would give us a bit of courage.
Are we not allowed to “count ourselves” and not allowed to “express our voice”? This is precisely what I would fight for now, in the place of Navalny and other politicians — digital identity for all the “dissenters,” which would allow us to both count ourselves and vote (“Putin’s elections” we won’t win — but at least we won’t remain silent and will express our opinion within the legal framework!).
In “The Story of a German” by Haffner, among other things, he talks about the attempt of those disagreeing with Hitler to create a project of “good Germans” (there was such a project) — their failure then and the herd-like disparagement of the idea by Chichvarkin-Kasparov now does not remove the belief (and responsibility) from us to still try: Nansen managed to do it.
From Nansen to Navalny
More than a million Russians left after the start of the war with Ukraine. How many more supporters does Navalny have inside and outside the country? Let’s not wait for a bright future — there are enough of us to start making it for ourselves. And the problem of uniting is not in Putin but in ourselves, and he takes advantage of this.
Too much is demanded of Navalny while he was in prison, and now he’s been killed. I think and thought that the main problem here is that Navalny is “fighting for power in Russia,” “wants to win the elections against Putin” — and this is a dead-end path (sorry). 140 million such diverse Russians, all these centuries of history, victories, and defeats, all these accumulated problems — ‘Mother Russia’ is all too complicated a “system with an outdated backend and unclear user experience.”
Here we need to answer the question: do we want “checkers” or to “go”? If “to go” — then enough burdening him, and him listening to us and coming up with (often futile strained) answers “what to do with Russia?” and so on. Nothing, just leave it aside for a while, it hasn’t collapsed for so many centuries and won’t collapse now.
Navalny has long been more than Russia. And the real “innovation” (sorry) of Navalny was to “go beyond the boundaries of the possible,” to become the first cross-border politician, a borderless politician. He has supporters not only from Russia, right? But from Belarus, from Ukraine, Poland, the USA, the UK, Germany? Why does he cut them off from himself? He already appeals to them, they feel that he is much closer to them in understanding and spirit, — and in return, he takes and tapes himself firmly with scotch to the abstract “millions of Russians”? Many of whom do not need him and will not need him! Why? Because it’s been “traditionally accepted” for centuries — you’re from Russia, so fight for the presidential post in Russia, and only think about Russians, never think about the others… Sorry, but who said so?
If Navalny were from the tech sector — he wouldn’t worry at all: “I’m aligned with those who are aligned with me, and the rest, I’m not against them, but they’re not my problem.” It’s even a matter of values: what if Navalny won the elections, then what? What to do with Putin’s supporters? Again “violence”? Can’t Navalny do something useful for those who like him, and let Putin please his supporters? How to move away from violence at all?
Perhaps the problem (and the limitation in political imagination) of modern opposition politicians is that they think too much “about Russia,” “about all Russians,” “about our great past and culture,” they think spectacularly a lot about Putin and “what he’s wrong about” (nothing so effectively validates his participation in the game as their ability to not forget about him for a second), think about the legacy of Pushkin-Gagarin-Tchaikovsky, think “about public sector workers and pensioners”… There’s nothing wrong with these thoughts, except that it constantly pulls them back, doesn’t allow them to “break free from the ground” and really come up with some fresh and new plan, and we see all around only proposals for “improvement.” At this moment, in tech startups, they say “the moose is dead — drop the moose.”
Close your eyes, relax, don’t be afraid to dream a bit — imagine that you are building a new state from absolute zero, what is it like? Maybe it’s not Russia at all, don’t be afraid to think not “by the rules,” don’t limit yourself — otherwise, your imagination will never work at full capacity. I think it’s very important to talk not only about WHAT specifically we think, but also HOW we think: what we can think about at all, what we can question, what in reality is simpler than it seems, and so on.
In his book “The Network State: How to Start Your Own Country,” Balaji Srinivasan, co-founder of Coinbase and a prominent figure in blockchain technologies and cryptocurrencies, details the structural changes that will occur as a result of introducing digital identity (I also recommend the book “Identity is the New Money” by David Birch). This will lead to the automation of the visa application process, hotel and flight registrations, border crossings, online courts, marriages-divorces and wills, petition signing (the problem with change.org is that it does not meet KYC requirements, and anyone can sign a petition any number of times), creating companies and unions, and even conducting (online, of course) elections. People will realize that they can quickly and inexpensively unite into new communities, establish their rules, and ensure their enforcement. With the increase in travel and remote work due to the digitization of the economy, the role of national states with geographical borders will decrease. Soon we will witness the emergence of new “borderless” or network states.
The idea of a “network state” (metastate) involves transforming traditional states with geographical borders into global online communities built on common ideas, interests, and values. They can function alongside traditional national states, allowing people to have allegiance to ideologies, not just geography (or nation). As digital identity develops and the influence of network states grows, people will start to identify more with their chosen community based on values, rather than the country of their birth or residence. You don’t necessarily have to become an advocate for the theories of new metastates right away — the text tried to raise two questions. Practically — no matter how many mutual misunderstandings and grievances we have, it’s necessary to understand that our disunity is currently our biggest problem and the source of Putin’s and his team’s strength. Theoretically — not to fall for his bait and not play his games, but to not be afraid to think creatively and go beyond commonly accepted judgments and conceptions of what our future with you can be.
A cool project was launched by the office of the legitimately elected president (in exile) Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya on the “alternative passport” for Belarusians living abroad or unable to leave the country. I think, given the current mourning for Alexey Navalny, his supporters being handed draft notices or being arrested with flowers, and Putin and his team already copying Lukashenko’s experience of forcibly returning emigrants by not issuing them new passports — this experience could be very useful for Navalny’s Foundation and his wife Yulia. Another question is, why two identical projects? From the perspective of common problems and shared values, it would be much more effective to join forces with Tsikhanouskaya’s team.
Yulia Navalnaya at the meeting with the heads of the European Union in Brussels on February 19th: “make a distinction between Putin and Russia. People fleeing from war and dictatorship are not your enemies. They need sympathy and protection. They should not be punished; they need assistance. A mechanism similar to a modern Nansen commission is necessary.”
Yulia Navalnaya called on the Members of the European Parliament (the full text in Russian here) on February 28th: “Alexey was an innovator. Are you not allowed on TV? You start making videos on YouTube so that the whole country watches them. Are you not allowed to participate in elections? You come up with a strategy for tactical voting that will take seats away from the ruling party. Even from Putin’s GULAG, Alexey managed to convey project ideas that panicked the Kremlin. He was the opposite of everything dull.” “This is the answer to the question. If you truly want to defeat Putin, you need to become innovators. It’s impossible to harm Putin with another resolution or another package of sanctions that is no different from the previous ones.” “In this fight, you have reliable allies — tens of millions of Russians who are against the war, against Putin, against the evil he brings. You should not persecute them — on the contrary, you should work together with them. With us.”
Ukraine Has Every Chance to Become the First Metastate
We have been living for a long time in an economy where commodity goods are rapidly losing their value, while sectors related to technology and services, as well as the talents that create them, are becoming more and more valuable. In this context, why should Zelensky focus on reclaiming land when he can acquire a much more valuable asset in the form of at least 1 million talented Russians?
Over 1 million well-educated Russians, who disagree with Putin and his war with Ukraine, and who work in technology companies and create new companies and jobs, have been forced to leave the country. Why not make them supporters? Why not offer them to become new Ukrainians, pay taxes in Ukraine, invest in the country’s recovery, and the development of new technologies? If you take a minimum of $10,000 and multiply it by a million people, that’s $10 billion USD. Perhaps they work remotely from different countries, but a minimal simplified tax regime could be established. Another $10 billion dollars a year?
In this regard, the popularity of Zelenskyy and the trust in him not only in Ukraine raises the question: why can’t non-Ukrainians vote for him? If they like his vision for the future, his leadership, the fresh air he’s brought into politics. This was back in 2008, long before the pivotal moment with the arrest of Khodorkovsky and the point of no return with the invasion of Crimea — but even then, I looked at Obama’s election campaign, something new and fresh in politics, and thought, “Why can’t I vote for him?”. Why can’t I vote for Zelenskyy myself? Ukraine can become something much bigger (not smaller!) than the Ukraine that was (on the map). And it’s not about the territory — ask any successful company owner: it’s about the people.
And it’s incorrect to talk about the concept of metastates as “imaginary states” — the paradigm of “national states” is also quite young. The modern idea of a nation is the fruit of European political philosophy and practical politics of the 18th and 19th centuries. Thinkers and rulers united disparate communities into nations, which often did not even share a common language. Most contemporary scholars consider nations “imagined communities.” That is, their unity is not a natural given but exists only insofar as many people believe in the “nation” and their belonging to it. An important component of this belief is a sense of common destiny. For example, a person identifying with a certain nation may feel as a personal issue that a piece of land claimed by this nation does not belong to it. It’s not even necessary for the person to have ever been to this land. He belongs to the nation as to a collective personality, which has its own rights and interests, as well as character and mission. And all this becomes the personal rights, interests, character, and mission of this person.
Government-as-a-Service Paradigm
Estonia’s digital society offers a compelling vision of the future, one in which the constraints of physical geography are transcended by the boundless possibilities of the digital world. e-Estonia and e-Residency were very cool and visionary projects — long before the futuristic bestseller “The Network State” by Balaji, where he describes in detail the structural changes that will occur as a result of the introduction of digital identity and the evolution of metastates.
For Ukraine, embarking on a similar path could not only redefine its place in the global order but also offer its citizens a level of service and efficiency that matches the best in the world. In an innovative twist on governance, Mykhailo Fedorov presents “Government-as-a-Service” through DIIA [“Action”], positioning it as Ukraine’s potential leading export in the near future. This pioneering concept reimagines the traditional functions of government, leveraging technology to offer streamlined, digital public services on a global scale. DIIA’s approach not only revolutionizes how citizens interact with their government but also sets a new standard for digital governance, potentially making it Ukraine’s most significant contribution to the global market.
As nations around the globe grapple with the challenges of the 21st century, Estonia’s metastate experience stands as a beacon of hope, a reminder that innovation, when thoughtfully applied, can transform society for the better. This journey, encapsulated in the Estonian metastate experience, is particularly pertinent for countries like Ukraine, seeking to navigate their way through the complexities of modern governance and digital transformation.
In the digital age, where borders are becoming increasingly porous and the global landscape is rapidly evolving, Estonia stands out as a beacon of innovation and forward-thinking. The small Baltic nation, with its modest population of 1.3 million, has embarked on an ambitious journey to redefine what it means to be a country in the 21st century.
At the heart of Estonia’s digital revolution is the e-Residency program, a brainchild of visionaries like Taavi Kotka, Estonia’s former chief information officer, and Kaspar Korjus. Launched with the promise of making Estonia a “borderless country,” the e-Residency initiative allows individuals worldwide to partake in Estonian services, such as banking and business, regardless of their physical location. This revolutionary concept has not only attracted global entrepreneurs but also laid the groundwork for what could be termed “competitive governance.”
Imagine a world where governments compete for citizens, not through territorial conquests or economic incentives alone but through the quality of their digital infrastructure and the ease of accessing public services. Estonia’s digital society, e-Estonia, embodies this vision. From voting online to challenging parking tickets from the comfort of one’s home, the Estonian government has digitized nearly all public services, creating a seamless and efficient ecosystem that serves as a model for nations worldwide. Adopting Estonia’s X-Road data exchange platform could safeguard sensitive information against cyber threats, a concern that is all too real for Ukraine given its strategic position and recent history.
For Ukraine, a country striving to overcome its own set of challenges, from bureaucratic inefficiencies to geopolitical tensions, the Estonian Metastate Experience offers valuable lessons. By embracing digital transformation, Ukraine could not only streamline its public services but also create an environment that fosters innovation, attracts global talent, and encourages economic growth.
Yet, the journey towards digital statehood is not without its challenges. Estonia’s experience highlights the importance of balancing innovation with security, inclusivity, and public trust. Issues such as banking access for e-residents and political backlash against perceived privileges for non-Estonians underscore the need for careful policy design and stakeholder engagement. The implementation of a digital identity system should reduce red tape and corruption while increasing transparency and trust.
For Ukraine, adopting a similar model would require not only technological investment but also a cultural shift towards embracing digital society. Moreover, Ukraine’s path to digital transformation would need to consider its (extremely hard, but) unique socio-political context, adapting Estonia’s lessons to local realities and other govtech best practices.
The Estonian metastate experience is more than just a testament to what a small country can achieve with borderless vision and determination; it is a blueprint for the future of governance. As Ukraine looks to the future, the Estonian model offers a glimpse of what is possible when technology and governance converge to create a borderless society that is connected, efficient, and inclusive.
A New Culture of the Digital State: Running Ukraine Like a Startup
In a world where technology seamlessly blends with governance to forge new pathways for societal progress, Ukraine emerges as a beacon of innovation, spearheaded by the visionary Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov. Drawing inspiration from Estonia’s digital transformation, Fedorov is reimagining Ukraine’s future with a startup’s agility and a venture capitalist’s boldness.
The DIIA’s [“Action”] Government-as-a-Service, is not just a project, a state-in-a-smartphone app that has revolutionized how government services are accessed by the public; it’s the herald of Ukraine’s metamorphosis into a digital state and startup nation, poised to become the country’s next significant export. With DIIA, Fedorov has effectively digitized the Ukrainian state, making it more transparent, efficient, and resistant to corruption. This initiative has been so successful that it is now being exported to Estonia, a nation already renowned for its digital governance, thereby reversing the flow of digital innovation.
Under Fedorov’s leadership, Ukraine has demonstrated unprecedented scrappiness and flexibility, traits emblematic of the most agile startups. From developing an air alert app overnight with Ajax Systems to innovating a defense industry from the ground up, Fedorov has leveraged his Big Tech connections to isolate Russia digitally and materially, showcasing a dynamic blend of technological prowess and strategic acumen. This approach has enabled Ukraine to not only survive but thrive under conditions that would stymie less innovative governments.
The essence of Fedorov’s vision lies in treating governance-as-a-service, akin to how startups view their product offerings. This paradigm shift has cultivated a new culture within the Ukrainian government and among its citizens, who now expect and demand convenient, accessible services. By fostering this environment, Fedorov has laid the groundwork for a legacy that transcends the immediate benefits of digital transformation, aiming to eradicate corruption and inefficiency through digitization.
His initiatives, such as the “IT Army of Ukraine” and the push for a digital blockade of Russia, illustrate a comprehensive strategy that integrates cyber warfare with traditional defense mechanisms. The recent expansion of Ukraine’s drone program under his guidance exemplifies how technology can transform warfare, echoing his broader vision of a digitally empowered state.
His role in mobilizing international support through innovative platforms like United24 demonstrates an adeptness at navigating global tech ecosystems, drawing support and resources to bolster Ukraine’s war effort and infrastructure development. This global perspective, combined with a deep understanding of the power of digital platforms, positions Ukraine as a forward-thinking nation ready to export its governance model.
Fedorov is steering Ukraine towards becoming a digital-first nation, where every interaction with the government is as seamless as streaming on Netflix or ordering on Amazon. It’s clear that Ukraine, under Fedorov’s guidance, is not waiting for the future to arrive. It’s actively building it, turning governance into a service that’s as innovative, dynamic, and disruptive as the startups that dominate headlines and reshape our world. Ukraine’s digital transformation, spearheaded by the DIIA initiative, is more than just a national project; it’s a global case study on how technology can redefine the essence of governance and nationality in the digital age.
