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Here’s how blockchain could stop corrupt officials from stealing school lunches

Here’s how blockchain could stop corrupt officials from stealing school lunches

This article was originally published in World Economic Forum’s Agenda on May 17, 2019.
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Prysm Group
A Framework for Blockchain Governance Design: The Prysm Group Wheel

A Framework for Blockchain Governance Design: The Prysm Group Wheel

Blockchain platforms are economies written in code. The goal of any blockchain-based platform is to bring together participants — such as…
Go to the profile of Cathy Barrera, PhD
Cathy Barrera, PhD
The Prysm Group House: A Framework for the New Economics of Blockchain

The Prysm Group House: A Framework for the New Economics of Blockchain

Blockchain platforms are mini-economies in code. We introduce a comprehensive framework for effective blockchain economic design.
Go to the profile of Stephanie Hurder, PhD
Stephanie Hurder, PhD
Economics of Tokenized Incentives 3: Token Value Won’t Align Stakeholders

Economics of Tokenized Incentives 3: Token Value Won’t Align Stakeholders

I often hear people in the blockchain space assert some form of the following argument: if a platform creates a native token, such as a…
Go to the profile of Cathy Barrera, PhD
Cathy Barrera, PhD
Economics of Tokenized Incentives 2: Selecting Effective Performance Metrics

Economics of Tokenized Incentives 2: Selecting Effective Performance Metrics

In our previous post, we explained that pay for performance is useful when key desired outcomes cannot be specified in advance. Under…
Go to the profile of Cathy Barrera, PhD
Cathy Barrera, PhD
Blockchain needs users and economics can help.

Blockchain needs users and economics can help.

In the blockchain industry there are disagreements about many things. For example, will prevailing blockchain projects be permissioned or…
Go to the profile of Guido Molinari
Guido Molinari
Economics of Tokenized Incentives 1: Intro to Pay for Performance

Economics of Tokenized Incentives 1: Intro to Pay for Performance

This post is part of a series in which we discuss the principles of incentive design for blockchain platforms.
Go to the profile of Cathy Barrera, PhD
Cathy Barrera, PhD
Why Economic Design is Essential for Security Tokens

Why Economic Design is Essential for Security Tokens

Go to the profile of Stephanie Hurder, PhD
Stephanie Hurder, PhD
Asset-Backed Security Tokens: What you can learn from the Economics of Property Rights

Asset-Backed Security Tokens: What you can learn from the Economics of Property Rights

Go to the profile of Cathy Barrera, PhD
Cathy Barrera, PhD
Blockchain and legal (but repugnant) markets

Blockchain and legal (but repugnant) markets

This is a reprint of a guest post that I wrote for Professor Al Roth’s market design blog. Professor Roth is a Nobel Prize-winning…
Go to the profile of Stephanie Hurder, PhD
Stephanie Hurder, PhD
Blockchain Incentive Structures: What they are and why they matter

Blockchain Incentive Structures: What they are and why they matter

Founders of blockchain platforms must understand the nuances of incentives — what they are, what they aren’t, how they work and how they…
Go to the profile of Cathy Barrera, PhD
Cathy Barrera, PhD
Blockchain Governance must move beyond voting

Blockchain Governance must move beyond voting

There is conversation that new voting mechanisms will revolutionize blockchain governance.
Go to the profile of Stephanie Hurder, PhD
Stephanie Hurder, PhD
Hard Forks: You can't always get what you want

Hard Forks: You can't always get what you want

Go to the profile of Stephanie Hurder, PhD
Stephanie Hurder, PhD
Blockchain and Coordination Games: Failures and Focal Points

Blockchain and Coordination Games: Failures and Focal Points

Key Concepts from Economics
Go to the profile of Cathy Barrera, PhD
Cathy Barrera, PhD
The Economics of Tokenization Part I: Not Everything Can (or Should) be Tokenized

The Economics of Tokenization Part I: Not Everything Can (or Should) be Tokenized

Some blockchain enthusiasts predict that one day in the not too distant future, everything will be tokenized. Ownership rights for all…
Go to the profile of Stephanie Hurder, PhD
Stephanie Hurder, PhD
Nash Equilibria on Blockchain Platforms

Nash Equilibria on Blockchain Platforms

Key Concepts from Economics
Go to the profile of Stephanie Hurder, PhD
Stephanie Hurder, PhD
Trust in a Trust-less System

Trust in a Trust-less System

In a recent post on the MIT Cryptoeconomics Lab blog, one of our economist wrote about The Blockchain Effect: Network Effects without…
Go to the profile of Guido Molinari
Guido Molinari
What is Governance For?

What is Governance For?

There has been a lot of talk in the blockchain community about what governance systems should look like, but little has been said about…
Go to the profile of Cathy Barrera, PhD
Cathy Barrera, PhD
What is Voting For?

What is Voting For?

Using Economics to Inform Design
Go to the profile of Cathy Barrera, PhD
Cathy Barrera, PhD
Why do we Need Economists in Blockchain?

Why do we Need Economists in Blockchain?

In my recent post, “Who is an economist?”, I proposed a straightforward definition to establish who is an economist.
Go to the profile of Guido Molinari
Guido Molinari
Incomplete Contracts and Blockchain

Incomplete Contracts and Blockchain

Key Concepts from Economics
Go to the profile of Cathy Barrera, PhD
Cathy Barrera, PhD
Who is an Economist?

Who is an Economist?

Over the past several months I have noticed a fascinating phenomenon within the blockchain community; several long time industry insiders…
Go to the profile of Guido Molinari
Guido Molinari
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