Burkina Faso
Country snapshot
Authors: Ajoy Datta and Fletcher Tembo. More on scope, methodology and sources.
Economic, social and governance indicators
71% of the Burkina Faso’s population is concentrated in rural areas, with the population increasing fourfold since its independence to just over 20 million in 2019 (Feng, 2015).
The country has experienced low but steady per capita income growth since gaining independence in 1960, limited only by periodic droughts experienced by Sahelian countries.
Burkina Faso hasn’t undergone structural transformation to an industrially oriented economy despite efforts (especially in the 1970s), nor have benefits of economic growth been inclusive, with high levels of inequality (Koussoube et al., 2014).
Poverty rates have remained largely unchanged (UNU WIDER, 2014), with the absolute number of poor people increasing by more than 2 million between 1994/95 and 2009 (Koussobe et al., 2014).
It is classified as a least developed country; in 2017 Burkina Faso ranked 183rd out of 189 countries and territories scoring 0.423 on the Human Development Index (UNDP, 2018).
Citizens have complained about problems with basic infrastructure such as water, education (particularly secondary and tertiary education) and healthcare (BTI, 2018). Only 20% of the population have access to sanitation.
Citizens felt state performance was broadly improving in health, education and police services (Afrobarometer). Citizens may regard recent gains as especially noteworthy precisely because of the country’s low base of state performance (Bratton et al., 2019).
Governance indicators have remained stable in recent years:
- On transparency and accountability: scores 45.7 out of 100 on the 2020 Ibrahim Index of African Governance, with no change over the past five years.
- On voice and accountability: the country scores 39.9 out of 100 on the 2019 Worldwide Governance Indicators — a reduction of 3 points over the past five years.
- Global Corruption Barometer 2019: 62% of citizens agreed that ‘Ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption’ in Burkina Faso — an increase of 1 % point in the past five years.
Political context
Historical and political factors
A former French colony, Burkina Faso gained independence in 1960, initially operated as a one-party state, with transitions in power made forcibly through military coups.
In 1987, Blaise Compaore ousted Thomas Sankara and went on to rule for 27 years as part of the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP). The need to distribute rents to key members of the ruling coalition was often to the detriment of investments in economic and social sectors.
By the early 2010s the ruling coalition was showing signs of weakness. Soldiers in the military were agitating against increased inequalities, and citizens were making more demands for democracy and accountability tied to increasing literacy and urbanisation (Koussobe et al., 2014).
In 2014, Compaore was ousted in a popular uprising. Presidential and legislative elections brought to power Roch Marc Kabore of the People’s Movement for Progress (MPP) (formed out of the CDP), the country’s first formally elected civilian leader.
Formal political competition continues to be weak. The CDP and MPP control an extensive patronage network including key public administration and political institutions. This provides the parties with access to considerable resources with which to secure electoral success.
The re-election of president Kabore in November 2020 was not unexpected therefore. Of a population of 20 million, 8 million were registered to vote and only 3 million voted. Lower voter turnout suggested that people had little faith in the formal political system.
‘People don’t believe in the leaders and are disillusioned by democracy and believe that solutions to the main problems are not found amongst the political leadership. Instead, people have more faith in traditional leaders and religious leaders, and perhaps some civil society leader.’ (Key informant interview, November 2020)
The president is able to exert considerable power. Decision-making authority within the government is largely concentrated within the executive and at the centre. The National Assembly lacks efficiency and oversight mechanisms, while the judiciary is dominated and politicised in practice by the executive.
The military can exert considerable power and faith leaders have significant authority. Military power was shown during the 2015 coup crisis (BTI, 2018) and Muslim associations successfully contested government proposed regulation to reinforce secularism, which included a ban on praying in public spaces (Garda World, 2018)).
Public services
Within the executive, decisions on budget and human resources are made centrally. For instance, by the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Ministry of Civil Service, Labour and Social Security, while other ministries carry them out.
Decentralisation was designed to bring social services and administration closer to the people. However, limited financial and technical resources have severely constrained the extent to which any local autonomy could be exercised (World Bank, 2015).
The government has established a legal and regulatory framework to improve public services but this has not translated into actual improvements. Concentration of financial and human resources at the centre limits the administration’s capacity to respond to citizen needs.
Weak capacity to deliver essential public services is exacerbated by the fact that many front-line workers — like teachers and magistrates — work as managers and administrators in key ministries. This is reflected in the country’s poor scores across a range of public sector and governance indicators (World Bank, 2015).
The role of international actors
Burkina Faso has been highly dependent on international aid flows, which made up 8.7% of the country’s gross national income in 2016 (OECD, 2017). Its most important bilateral donors were the European Union, France, Germany and the United States.
International institutions provide some constraints to policymaking. For instance, monetary policy is set by the Central Bank of West African States, while fiscal policy needs to consider the frameworks set by the West African Economic and Monetary Union and Economic Community of West African States, and governance and corruption is monitored by the Bretton Woods Institutions.
Donor pressure and resources have been influential. For instance, helping to increase public expenditure in education and health. Without this, it is unlikely that the country would have experienced high rates of growth in school enrolment after 1990. However, donors are themselves constrained, limiting the amount of pressure they can exert on the government (Koussoube, 2014).
Encouraged by foreign donors, the government passed anti-corruption legislation in 2015. Despite this, weak institutions, a lack of information and a culture of impunity has meant that officials often engage in corrupt practices (GAN Anti-Corruption Portal, 2016).
Industry
Given most of Burkina Faso’s population are low-income, the main market for would-be entrepreneurs is in public tenders. Entrepreneurs linked to the ruling party are most likely to benefit, while small and medium-sized enterprises often have to pay bribes to secure contracts (Akouwerabou and Bako, 2013).
Furthermore, government austerity has resulted in industrial action — especially among public sector workers, which has intensified as resources have been increasingly diverted to address national insecurity (Garda World, 2018).
Burkina Faso is one of the world’s top-20 producers of gold. The country is generally not well endowed with natural resources but does have significant reserves of gold, making up 16% of government revenues in 2015 and 65% of the country’s total exports.
However, the government has had to reduce tax rates on profits to attract foreign investors, thereby reducing domestic revenues. This is due to relatively high production costs as a result of the country’s landlocked position (Koussoube et al., 2014).
Gold mining has expanded considerably since the late 2000s, and almost all mines have been the subject of local conflicts between local communities on the one hand and state and company security forces on the other.
Membership of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) has had little impact on practices in the mining sector:
‘I don’t think the EITI has brought about a lot of change to Burkina Faso’s mining sector… In my opinion, real change has to come from the people on the ground, not from the international system of regional initiatives. People on the ground want to see some real benefit from the mining sector (for example a percentage share of the mining profits) and they don’t see that just by having more transparency in the sector. I don’t see these kinds of initiatives having any real impact on the political leaders either.’ (Key informant interview, November 2020)
Civil society and citizen engagement
Burkina Faso has considerable civil society traditions, rooted in pre-colonial society. This comprises mainly groupement villageois (village groups) and other community-based organisations (BTI, 2018).
More professional civil society organisations in urban areas formally enjoy a range of freedoms in the form of, e.g. constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech (BTI, 2018).
Some NGOs have mobilised around corruption, establishing the NGO Anti-Corruption National Network. They have reported pervasive corruption in, for instance, the customs service, tax agencies and the police forces and its effects (GAN Integrity, 2016).
The media has enjoyed a better operating environment since mass protests in 2014. Defamation has been decriminalised, the public broadcaster has experienced less political interference and self-censorship among journalists has eased. However, journalists continue to experience pressure from government officials (Freedom House, 2018).
Despite theoretical freedoms, on the whole, civil society’s political influence is limited. CSOs tend to play an advisory role to government, addressing problems and mediating conflict rather than challenging them (key informant interview, November 2020). When NGOs do challenge government figures, they face harassment in carrying out their work (Freedom House, 2020).
Most citizens do not see civil society as representative of their needs and aspirations and too close to the political elite:
‘The traditional CSOs have lost a lot of credit and confidence among people because they are seen as not being too preoccupied with citizen’s needs. People feel the same distrust towards CSOs and their leaders as they feel towards politicians. They see the same CSO leaders in charge for decades and being too close to the political elite and the political establishment.’ (Key informant interview, November 2020)
Citizens have increasingly resorted to direct action and street protests — a dynamic that the government has partially tolerated (Freedom House, 2020)
Less-formal youth organisations have effectively mobilised young people through social media (key informant interview, November 2020). For instance, citizens — especially young people — rose up unsupported by formal CSOs against Blaise Compaore. But at least 14 unarmed citizens were shot dead during protests against the 2015 coup by the presidential guard, and many protesters were arrested, demonstrating the continued influence of the military and limits of the government’s tolerance (BTI, 2018).
