Senegal
Country snapshot
Authors: Ajoy Datta and Fletcher Tembo. More on scope, methodology and sources.
Economic, social and governance indicators
The Economic Freedom Index rates Senegal as generally free, with an expanding economy over the past five years. Its score is 58.0–110th in the world and 13th among 47 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, putting it above regional average.
However, economic freedom is held back by a defective judicial system, low government integrity and a lack of business freedom (apart from some few leading sectors, such as tourism and transport).
Senegal’s GDP growth outlook overall is favourable and projected to remain solid at 6.8% in 2020, reflecting higher investment and exports. Growth rates could exceed 7% from 2021 onwards if fiscal vulnerabilities are contained and transformational reforms are implemented to crowd-in private sector investments (World Bank Press Release, 2020).
In terms of key governance indicators: the Ibrahim Index of African Governance gives Senegal’s performance on Transparency and Accountability a rating of 57.2 out of 100 — a trend of “slowing improvement” over the past five years. The World Governance Indicators rate Senegal 55.7 in voice and accountability, down by 2 points. According to the Global Corruption Barometer, however, 52% of citizens agree that ‘Ordinary people can make a difference in the fight against corruption’ in Senegal — a 4-point improvement over the past five years.
This suggests a general positive trajectory in the transparency, participation and accountability (TPA) field, albeit at a slower rate of progress than expected.
Political context
In February 2019, President Macky Sall won a second consecutive term with 58% of the vote in the first round, avoiding a runoff. Two leading opposition leaders were barred from running because of previous, politically fraught convictions for embezzlement of public funds (Freedom House, 2020).
In May 2019, lawmakers approved a controversial measure to abolish the post of prime minister, which the President signed. This prompted outcry from critics, who accused him of seeking to consolidate power and undercut checks and balances (Freedom House, 2020).
Corruption remains a serious problem in Senegal, and high-level officials often act with impunity. Anti-corruption bodies enforce the law unevenly and are sometimes viewed as politically motivated (Freedom House, 2020).
In 2014, and again in 2018, violent clashes between students and the police demonstrated the potential for conflict over the serious crisis in the education system. Frequent clashes continue to take place over monetary issues and housing problems, and are occasionally politicised. The situation is exacerbated by high youth unemployment in the country and a sense of marginalisation among some groups (BTI, 2020: 32).
The 2012 election and the 2016 referendum have strengthened the role of civil society organisations (CSOs), although the participation of civil society in the governance of the country is still somewhat limited.
Broadly speaking, President Macky Sall has a more inclusive governance style than his predecessor and maintains strong political and personal relations with civil society leaders and media representatives. He is generally supportive of CSO activities and integrates CSOs and their leaders into policymaking processes.
In May 2016, Sall held a “national dialogue” with the opposition, civil society and religious organisations. The event was more a series of presentations than a conversation — although it did pave the way for the release and subsequent exile of Karim Wade.
There has not, however, been any meaningful follow-up (BTI, 2020: 36). This suggests that even though spaces for dialogue exist in Senegal, their real end is usually not known, implying perhaps that it is merely window dressing.
According to interviewees, democracy in Senegal is entrenched in the laws, regulations and practice. There many legal frameworks — including in the constitution and other regulations — that stipulate the need to facilitate citizen participation.
Institutions have been put in place to make it easy for citizens to contribute to policymaking, monitoring and accountability. There are also provisions for participation at the sectoral level — for example, in land governance the development of one particular policy took three years because of a wide range of consultations that were involved. In the health sector, to deliver universal health coverage, the government has put in place a ministerial committee that includes CSOs and meets regularly.
‘If you look back, we have moved from confrontation and protest to becoming more and more a force of proposition, which the government can now easily take into account in their decision making, e.g. the universal health care law has drawn largely on CSO contributions and research. The political space is wide enough for TPA engagement in this ‘force for proposition’, and the government can take a lot of ideas from the private sector, CSOs and other actors.’ (Key informant interview, November 2020)
There is a multiplicity of free media — radio, TV and broadcast press — as one interviewee indicated:
‘If you listen to the radio in Senegal you wonder, how can the government accept that. They have also adopted the Access to Information Act — which took a long time — in advocacy for more than 25- 26 years and we are almost there now There are also hearings at the national assembly where they ask CSOs to express themselves on what they are working on.’ (Key informant interview, November 2020)
Civil society and citizen engagement
Civic engagement in Senegal has two distinct facets: (1) engagement in the political arena and (2) engagement around service provision, interviewees told us. In the political arena there’s a general perception that CSOs adopt political discourse and positions to engage with the government and that this is problematic. In the service provision arena, it’s perceived that engagement tends to achieve more than in the political space because CSOs work on thematic issues that resonate with people’s lives and livelihoods.
Opposition parties, civil society and interest groups have criticised the deteriorating state of democratic institutions. It remains to be seen whether the recent constitutional reforms in the 2016 referendum, some of which have not yet been implemented, will improve the situation (BTI, 2020: 14). At the end of 2018, the opposition movement Front de Résistance Nationale (FRN), which consists largely of young people, organised rallies to protest parrainage — the lack of transparency in the electoral process and the exclusion of Karim Wade and Khalifa Sall (BTI, 2020: 15).
Senegalese trade unions are active, but their impact remains relatively insignificant as they represent only a fraction of the working population. Senegal’s formal economy, where unions are traditionally strong, is small and shrinking — employing just 500,000 people in the public and private sectors combined. Senegalese unions have only just started to be active in the much larger informal economy, which accounts for 95% of the economy.
The informal economy is largely self-organised. Some informal organisations have either national representation and/or presence in Dakar. Others are transitioning from ad-hoc groups to formal organisations in Dakar´s outlying communities. Some of these organisations have decided to join large central trade unions like the Confédération Nationale des Travailleurs du Sénégal, and the Confédération des Syndicats Autonomes (Abizaid, 2019).
In 2018, Senegal’s Ministry of the Interior recognised the Confederation of Informal Economy Organisations as the official trade union federation for the informally employed. This meant that workers would access benefits such as the Universal Health Coverage.
A recent decision to introduce a 10% threshold for elections to nominate federations for the tripartite social dialogue may lead to consolidation and greater organisational unity between unions, which would increase their influence (BTI, 2002: 16).
Associational life is rich in Senegal by sub-Saharan Africa standards, with numerous, highly active NGOs operating in the country.
However, many community groups and NGOs suffer from a lack of resources. NGOs often rely excessively on international donor funding. In doing so, they may lack credibility in the eyes of the government and among some citizens.
A mix of co-opted and critical CSOs. Some organisations, that played a vital role in President Wade’s 2012 election defeat and in the subsequent peaceful transition of power, have been co-opted into the government of President Sall. Others have resumed their more critical outsider roles.
In the run-up to the 2019 presidential elections, the government placed a number of restrictions on civil society, including deregistration. But it was unclear whether this was just nervousness about the election, or whether it marked a worrisome permanent shift (BTI, 2020: 31).
The media and CSOs play an active role in stimulating and facilitating public debate. And Senegal’s population is engaging openly with the government.
However, rights activists have expressed concern about the National Assembly’s passing of a bill on electronic communications in November 2018. The bill included a vaguely worded provision that expanded the regulatory power of the government over social media companies, could be used to shut down, tax or surveil communications on popular social media platforms (Freedom House, 2020).
The rights of private enterprise are generally well protected. Senegal ranks highly among other African countries in terms of transparency and accountability of government decisions. However, corruption and arbitrary government action remain a problem (BTI, 2020: 24).
Religious leaders in the form of the Sufi brotherhoods and their respective Imams exert significant informal political power/influence.
