Kenya
Country snapshot
Authors: Ajoy Datta and Fletcher Tembo. More on scope, methodology and sources.
Economic, social and governance indicators
Kenya’s economy has been growing, led by expanding consumer demand. Per capita GDP increased from $1,433 in 2015 to $1,931 in 2019, and overall GDP from $63.3 billion to $95.3 billion. Public debt, however, has also grown from 50% of GDP to 63% — much of which is domestic debt that ends up crippling private sector growth and then the economy.
In the Economic Freedom Index 2020, Kenya ranks 23rd among 47 countries in the sub-Saharan Africa region, scoring 55.3. This places it near the regional average but well below the world average, 132nd freest country.
The Kenyan economy has been rated as mostly unfree for more than two decades. In recent years, economic freedom has been curtailed by weak rule of law (especially government integrity) and poor freedom of investment and finance.
Policymaking and implementation remain vulnerable to risks such as drought, insecurity, corruption and political contestations between different political leaders.
Kenya’s economy has been severely hit by the COVID-19 pandemic — especially in terms of incomes and jobs (World Bank, 2020). The World Bank report attributes this to the containment measures that Kenya has adopted in response to the crisis, which have limited domestic business activities, citizen behaviour and trade and travel (affecting key foreign currency earners such as tourism).
The pandemic has increased poverty in Kenya by 4 percentage points (or an additional 2 million poor) due to its serious impact on livelihoods, causing sharp decreases in incomes and doubling unemployment to more than 10%. For the wage workers still in employment, they face reduced working hours and revenues, exacerbating food insecurity and human suffering.
Tax revenue also dropped below target, due to the economic slowdown and tax relief offered by the government, which at the same time increased public expenditure to strengthen the healthcare capacity to manage infections, protect the most vulnerable households and support businesses.
The net result is that Kenya is currently struggling on social and economic fronts (World Bank, 2020). FocusEconomics analysts project GDP growth of 5.0% in 2021 and 5.4% in 2022, but point to growing public debt as a challenge.
In terms of key governance indicators, the Ibrahim Governance Index 2020 rates Kenya 45.4 out of 100 in terms of transparency and accountability — an improving trend. The World Governance Indicators rate Kenya 36.5 for its voice and accountability performance — falling by 6 points over a five-year period. Kenya’s Global Corruption Barometer score has also fallen (by 4 points over the past five years), putting it at 54. The overall picture is one of decreasing governance performance, especially in the run-up to the 2022 general elections.
Political context
Kenya’s political economy is characterised by a continuous tension between redistribution politics (the struggle for an inclusive economy and access to key assets like land) and ‘recognition’ politics (the struggle for identity through ethnicity).
The push for group identities comes to the fore in political bargaining, competitive politics and general elections. But identity-informed bargaining undermines efforts to redistribute socioeconomic resources, and leads to increasing inequality and the emergence of elites who have access to resources because of who they are or identify as, making it difficult for asset redistribution to materialise (Branch, 2011).
In the past decade, the biggest shift in governance has been the promulgation of the 2010 constitution. The constitution is a central part of Kenya’s political settlement — the balance of power and agreement between groups about political and economic ‘rules’ — and of the country’s growth and redistribution agenda.
The 2010 constitution was followed by a decentralisation process that changed the Kenyan governance system, devolving power from a highly centralised state to 47 new county-level governments.
Articles 174 and 175 of the constitution are key in framing the context for transparency, participation and accountability in Kenya. They emphasise that devolution should: allow for self-governance by the people of Kenya; promote the democratic and accountable use of state power and public participation in decision-making; promote and protect the rights and interests of minorities and marginalised groups; and advance social and economic development and provision of and access to services throughout Kenya.
Putting into practice aspirations set out in the 2010 constitution has been a major challenge.
Newly created county governments have had to develop their own mechanisms to engage different actors — including the private sector, citizens, civil society, traditional leaders, faith-based organisations and even external agencies. Some counties with more progressive governors, such as Makueni County, champion participatory governance while others lag far behind.
Contextual differences within Kenya have meant progress towards meaningful devolution has been patchy because they require different approaches based on where the county is starting from, and this has had a direct impact on the character of TPA initiatives.
Some counties have achieved successes in better managing their resources. While in others there has been waste, mismanagement and corruption, as evidenced by reports of the Auditor General and Controller of Budget.
Inequalities are stark both between counties and within them. Therefore, the full potential of devolution is yet to be realised — and if this is not properly addressed, it could have widespread negative repercussions for Kenya’s development prospects.
The forthcoming 2022 elections are already shaping the political manoeuvres of various parties. Battles are being fought, for example, over the detail of the Building Bridges Initiative (BBI), which followed the March 2018 handshake between H.E. Uhuru Kenyatta and the Rt Hon. Raila Odinga. It was expected to bring about a constitutional review of how to reshape power and how it is contested. Some — especially those supporting the Vice President — see the BBI as a side show and unnecessary in the run up to elections.
These political manoeuvres tend to undermine efforts to evolve a meaningful and well-instituted policy and practice based on transparency and accountability. Should the referendum go ahead and the tabled BBI be passed, state-society contestations will be reshaped around new power bases, in addition to county governments and the executive.
It is difficult at the moment to see whether these bills would result in the deepening of democratic gains obtained over the past decade because significant forces are set against the BBI. The actors against the BBI are questioning the prudence of introducing new structures near general elections, the potential to increase bureaucratic spend. It has ended up dividing youth movements and civil society to a greater extent because of the ethnically linked political polarity.
Kenya has enacted progressive legislation, such as the 2003 Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, in addition to the 2016 Bribery Act, and established independent oversight bodies such as the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission.
But from a citizen perspective, these formal establishments appear to be having very little impact. Evidence suggests that Kenya continues to grapple with high levels of corruption, widespread and entrenched impunity — often associated with strong ties to politicians and essential services such as the police, judiciary and lands services continue to feature highly on the bribery index. As a result, the public mostly see state-led anti-corruption efforts as performative and applied selectively to advance political agendas
Civil society and citizen engagement
Kenya has an active NGO sector, with civil society having played a crucial role in building a democratic public sphere. Including, for example, during Kenya’s transition in 1999 to a multiparty democracy, its 2003 and 2004 constitutional conferences and the implementation of its 2010 constitution (BTI, 2020: 29).
However, civil society groups have faced growing obstacles in recent years. This includes repeated government attempts to deregister hundreds of NGOs for alleged financial violations.
The Kenyatta government took a critical stance towards NGOs, refusing to begin implementation of the Public Benefits Organizations Act. The Act was passed in 2013 to improve the regulatory framework for NGOs and offer greater freedom for them to operate (Freedom House, 2020). Instead, old legislation from the autocratic Moi era is still in force and, from time to time, used to interfere with and sabotage NGOs (BTI, 2020: 9).
In 2016, Kenya passed the Access to Information Act. It drew on the 2010 constitution, which provides that ‘Every citizen has the right of access to: (a) information held by the State; and (b) information held by another person and required for the exercise or protection of any right or fundamental freedom’ and encourages the Kenya government to ‘publish or publicise any important information affecting the nation’.
A number of legal provisions require that civil servants and public institutions provide or publicise accurate information in a timely fashion. Including: the Public Service (Values and Principles) Act (№1A of 2015) and the Public Finance Management Act (2012).
However, growing concerns around access to information undermine gains achieved in terms of the constitutional and legal positions. This includes enhanced state surveillance and monitoring, including on social media; threats to the freedom of expression and opinion via the Computer Misuse and Cybercrimes Act (2018); and a shrinking civic space, especially during the electoral period.
Devolution has increased spaces for citizens to engage. But different projects, like the Deepening Democracy Programme, attest to the fact that there are huge variations in the extent to which meaningful citizen engagement is possible.
Most citizens engage with their county governments through their Members of County Assembly (MCA). But MCAs tend to be weak in terms of their ability to interrogate reports produced by the county government (TIK, 2020).
56% of citizens do not have access to information about their county government performance on various issues. Those that do mostly access it through radio and TV (Transparency International Kenya, 2020). Only 31% of county governments proactively share information on their performance, despite all of them having dedicated access to information officers (ibid). The Integrated County Government Plans are among those documents that are shared.
There is clearly a lot of work to do in terms of expanding citizens’ access to actionable information. As one interviewee indicated:
‘On the other hand, nobody would facilitate you. In fact, the government would frustrate you by denying you information or providing it late and those kinds of tactics. This can be exemplified by how the budget process works with regard to the county integrated development plans. These are participatory platforms enacted in law and citizens are supposed to participate but what happens is that you won’t get the budget documents, and if you do get them, they won’t be in the appropriate format. This is how these participatory mechanisms are frustrated and how they become tick-in-the-box exercises.’ (Key informant interview, November 2020)
A few county governments, such as Makueni County, have gone further than simply making budgeting and planning documents available. Instead, the county executive engages the public during the preparation and approval of the annual budget through various forums (barazas — or meetings — and radio), through their public participation framework. These are, however, exceptions to the usually informal practices of county officials (KIPRA, 2019).
Most participation tends to be consultative rather than dialogical and empowering. And the creation of spaces or invitations to participate are often provided too short a notice to ensure meaningful engagement.
