Expanding the role of corruption in IFF

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Insights from U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre

19 min readJan 15, 2018

To make anti-IFF measures effective, policy makers will need to think much more critically about the *nature*, *location* and *type* of corruption that is relevant for *countering* IFF at country level. Photo by Stuart Rankin CC BY-NC 2.0.

Putting the IFF agenda into action at the country level. Part 8 of 9

Illicit financial flows (IFF) became an international concern in the late 2000s and are now an established policy concern in the development context. Still, policy makers have yet to address important questions about putting anti-IFF programmes into practice.This eighth blog post discusses the relationship between IFF, corruption and anti-corruption.

Corruption and illicit financial flows: A symbiotic relationship

The primary role of corruption in IFF may seem self-evident. Clearly, cross-border transfers of unlawful gains from corruption constitute IFF (see IFF definitions–crucial questions). However, only looking at corruption as a source of IFF misses important linkages between the two practices, as “[c]orruption is both a source and enabler of IFF” (High Level Panel on Illicit Flows from Africa, p. 51).

While the volume of IFF is notoriously difficult to estimate, it is perhaps most difficult to estimate a useful volume of IFF that is related to corruption (Forstater; Nitsch). Compared to the actual corruption crime level, few corruption cases are ever exposed and confirmed. It is only confirmed cases that can be used to establish how much of the cross-border flows of funds that relate to corruption with any accuracy (according to definitions in criminal law). The reason for that is that the existence of corruption as defined in law is confirmed by Courts of Law. Other accounts are based on perceptions or experiences of corruption that have not been tested and confirmed by a Court of Law. But such positivist views do not mean that non-confirmed instances of actual corruption do not occur. It would be absurd to claim that few legal judgements confirming corruption means a Kleptocracy or a country with weak justice system have few instances of actual corruption.

However, what is not confirmed has to be based on some model of estimation of what could be confirmed as corruption. In addition, to arrive at an estimation of corruption-based IFF, we also need to estimate the volume of the proceeds of the many different types of corruption, and how much of that crosses a border. Those definitions of IFF that also qualify cross-border flows of funds as IFF if funds are used for corruption also need an estimate of that (see IFF definitions–crucial questions).

For obvious reasons, estimations of what is unknown will never represent accuracy, why claiming credibility of estimations will require a significant leap of faith. The resulting volume of corruption-based IFF then needs to be added to the highly contested volumes emanating from other types of illegal activities for a total estimate (Nitsch). Those eventual estimates will depend on what definition that is used (see IFF definitions–crucial questions).

To make anti-IFF measures effective, policy makers need to think critically about the nature, location and type of corruption that is relevant for countering IFF.

Yet, to some extent, the link between corruption and IFF is self-evident in that corruption facilitates “all other aspects of IFFs” (High Level Panel on Illicit Flows from Africa, p. 32). By taking a broader view and keeping the different components of the definition in mind (see IFF definitions–crucial questions), I claim that the role of corruption is considerably larger than only representing a source of funds for cross-border transfers. The expanded role/function of corruption in IFF includes:

Facilitation of illegal transfers –Actors behind illegal (incl. criminal) activties can use corruption to access the international financial system for the purpose of hiding and eventually enjoying the proceeds of their illegal activities.
Facilitation of the illegal activities that generate the illicit funds themselves –The role of corruption in trafficking of drugs, humans, toxic waste, weapons and wildlife is well-known.
Incapacitation of public and private institutions that could prevent or detect cross-border transfers –Examples of such institutions are financial institutions, intelligence agencies, tax-, customs-, or trade authorities (Attila).
Constitute a source of funds for IFF –This is the current common understanding of the role of corruption in IFF.
Facilitation of the illegal use of funds that have crossed a border –Bribery of some kind can be used to make those with a role to prevent the illegal use of funds (for example for corruption, funding of terrorism, payment for trafficked goods or people) look the other way.

As is clear from the above, policy makers need to recognise corruption’s broad role in facilitating IFF. Policies dealing with corruption in IFF needs a considerably wider scope than simply addressing the underlying corruption in individual cases of IFF (Chêne). To make anti-IFF measures effective, policy makers will need to think much more critically about the nature, location and type of corruption that is relevant for countering IFF at country level.

Corruption as a systemic problem

Corruption is often systemic in developing countries. Besides indications from various indices, signs of systemic corruption are persistently weak bureaucratic effectiveness, weak results from attempts to improve public sector management, and possibly weak implementation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) framework (de Simone and Zagaris; OECD; Lawson; World Bank Independent Evaluation Group; Oxford Policy Management; Telgen et al.).

Where corruption is systemic, merely addressing individual incidents of corruption will not solve the problem. Nor will adopting simple technical fixes (Marquette and Peiffer). For example, requiring greater transparency of registered companies (e.g., beneficial ownership registries) is probably not a silver bullet given the great differences in government quality between countries. Neither is funding the training of law enforcement officers, if they are part of the corrupt state apparatus. The very agencies tasked with fighting corruption may already be part of an entrenched problem. That is why asking them to implement new reforms for integrity and assume they will suddenly shift their established interests will not help (Eriksson).

In these countries, policy makers will need to approach IFF differently than in countries where rule of law is strong and corruption is an exception to the rule (Mungiu-Pippidi). Where corruption is systemic, anti-IFF efforts cannot rely on a public bureaucracy that acts with integrity, adheres to the rule of law, and has interests aligned with its entrusted public mandate. The parts of anti-IFF policies that depend on those capacities either have to be abandoned or put on hold until those capacities have been established. Ignoring it means accepting a high risk of failure that can be expected to materialise.

An eye on context

The complexities of state and institution building are not normally part of the IFF discourse. Institution or capacity building issues are certainly part of reforms that seek to improve tax authorities, remove different types of secrecy (see Rethinking policies to remove secrecy) and establish effective AML regimes. Nevertheless, the attention to different contexts is fundamental to understand what approaches to address IFF are viable and not.

For example, the circumstance of state formation and state building display diametrically different traits than a modern state based on a Weberian state ideal (in its various varieties). Those different traits have direct consequences for the possible approach to strengthening accountability and addressing corruption that are needed before IFF can reliably be addressed through formal institutions at country level. Also in states where legitimate authority has been established and the state has been formed, there are great differences to consider in developing anti-IFF strategies that incorporate anti-corruption.

As a way of overcoming the analytical impasse regarding how to address corruption in different governance contexts with different types of legitimate authority, socio-political systems (governance regime types) have been distinguished based on universalism and those based on particularism (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006).

A universalist state is defined as one in which power is relatively evenly distributed between its different constituent groups, where the rule of law is strong and there is a clear distinction between the public and the private, and correspondingly, the social acceptance of corruption is very low. Corruption amounts to an exceptional behavior, which can be addressed through the criminal justice system.

In a particularistic state, however, power is concentrated in the hands of a numerically small elite, the distinction between public and private is blurred and those in power consider it normal to use their positions for economic and private gain. Consequently, engagement in corrupt practices becomes widely accepted and develops into an informal norm, i.e. corruption is not the exception but rather the norm. That means that the integrity required by police, prosecution and judiciary is likely to be weak and change of established norms through the criminal justice system is ineffective.

Attempts at measuring the prevailing social norms in universalist and particularistic societies have been made (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner). Unsurprisingly, universalist societies give preference to universally applied rules implying impartiality in the application of rules, treating equal cases equally. Universalist societies adhere to impersonal rules, and in general, exceptions that have the effect of weakening rules are resisted.

In particularist societies, the opposite applies. There, the exceptional nature of present circumstances is stressed, not the systemic consequences of abandoning impersonal/impartial rules for trust and reliability. Individuals are not primarily understood as citizens in an equal state-citizen relationship, but as a friend, brother, husband, child or person of unique importance, which merits a disregard of impersonal rules (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner).

Much of the current anti-corruption agenda is based on the assumption that legal-rational authority prevails, i.e. that the rule of law is strong enough and that formal institutions governed by impersonal formal rules are effective, or that either can be improved by providing technical assistance in the form of capacity building. In an already formed state, where the type and source of legitimate authority has already been established, overcoming endemic corruption appears to be a problem of distrust, resulting in a collective action problem (Marquette and Peiffer; Persson et al.; Levi). However, in a state under formation, that cannot be the case for several reasons:

Firstly, the source of legitimate authority has not been resolved, which means that adherence to the various rules or commands of the different sources of legitimate authority will have different logics as the context and nature of that authority differ. It will not help to try and build trust to overcome corruption when the source of authority attempting to do that is not even recognised by those it seeks to address.

Secondly, by looking at the lessons on state formation from the European experience, corruption as defined in a modern state appears to be one of the methods used for integration into centralised states by using the means of capital (the other two being coercion and commitment) (Tilly). “The feudalization of Europe and the corruption of its administration in early modern times allowed central states at least to bridge power gaps between cities and rural areas” (Schlichte, p. 39).

Thirdly, to arrive at a situation of adherence to impersonal formal rules in a modern state was not an intended outcome but a result of unplanned interrelated dynamics. In hindsight, two phases seem to have been involved in state formation. The first involved three dynamics: the emergence of the monopoly of the use of force, the simultaneous construction of the monopoly of taxation, and the long and meticulous work of disciplinization of individuals through state institutions (Schlichte; Tilly). This disciplinization of individuals was a transformation into obedient subjects by such state institutions such as armies, schools and universities (Foucault). “The spread of discourses and narratives that legitimized state rule was thus supplemented by practices that made peasants and unruly classes into law-abiding subjects of state institutions”(Schlichte, p. 36).

The second phase concerned how various social and economic factors shaped the forms, aims and scope of political rule and ordering, eventually arriving at the modern state with impersonal rules (Schlichte).

This brief overview of contextual considerations adds a vital perspective to consider in developing anti-IFF strategies that incorporate anti-corruption. The OECD has recently recognized the challenges to effectively addressing IFF in systemically corrupt environments. It asserts that countries need to adopt coherent policies based on good governance and rule of law (OECD, 2015, p. 138). However, as implied by the many different contextual circumstances above, adopting a policy is certainly no guarantee for its realisation.

International stakeholders have adopted policies that supported rule of law programs for many years with limited results (Carothers). It might therefore be surprising to learn that it was only very recently that a theory for the microfoundations (descriptions of agents’ decisions and choices based on credible research) of the rule of law emerged (Hadfield and Weingast). In its absence, support has been directed at institutional frameworks and enforcement, rather than on creating a local context where rule of law can eventually take root (Kleinfeld).

This has implications for the development of anti-IFF strategies that incorporate anti-corruption policies: they cannot simply assume the rule of law. That means reliance on formal institutions as effective in the anti-corruption approach may be the wrong focus of attention, although the building of stronger and more effective formal institutions as such may still be needed.

Countering corruption through collective action?

Currently, there are a few alternatives that are presented as options in contexts of weak rule of law and systemic corruption. Some assert that broad coalitions can use collective action to create “islands of integrity” in countries with systemic corruption (Gürkayanak et al.; Storey). These are agencies that operate with integrity on a sea of systemic corruption. If they resist general norms of corruption, they can guard against IFF. However, more evidence is needed about how these islands of integrity would work, if they are likely to be sustainable with power shifts, or whether they can influence societal norm change.

Others assert that coalitions can act to demand and influence change, and hold corrupt governments to account (Mungiu-Pippidi et al.; Mungiu-Pippidi; Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston). These coalitions would be a normative restraint on the ruling power, while also seeking stronger legal restraints on the very same ruling power. Similarly, self-interested contestation over the use of power can be a normative constraint on government, should those contesting have sufficiently strong power and in particular if a government depends on them (Johnston). Examples of such dependent relationships across different governance regimes are government-clients (various: voters, political parties, ethnic groups, regions and cities, companies, etc.), government-patrons (various: criminals/organised crime networks, foreign countries, militias, companies, international organisations etc.), government-parliament, government-tax payers, government-international lenders (WB, ADB, AfDB, IMF, EBRD, AIIB, CDBII, etc.), government-international donors, etc. (see Rethinking policies to remove secrecy).

Nevertheless, these efforts to reduce corruption through collective action are unlikely to succeed unless the groups involved are independent of government influence and fairly represent society at large rather than narrow interests of a benign or malign nature (MSI Integrity). That may be difficult to achieve in a country where corruption is part of the lifeblood of society, for example during state building or formation, or in states with considerable oppression, making corruption an important mechanism to avoid oppression (Ledeneva). Equally, where neither key figures, interest groups nor a sufficiently large number of citizens have realised that they have “a stake in effective, credible, accountable government,” we should not expect any strong collective action for change (Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston, p. 259). For that to emerge, the victims of the consequences of corruption must be able to envisage and want a credible alternative that represents an improved role, behaviour and value of having government in a nation state. They would also have to believe in their ability to change status quo (Bandura), and have sufficient trust in others to seek their cooperation (Ostrom).

Where such circumstances are missing, the better policy option would have a more fundamental nation-building nature. Looking back at the development of Western European societies, the development of the “modern state” was driven by the emergence of new societal powers, i.e. economic classes powerful enough to formulate, represent and organise around their interests in contestation over other interests. In much of the developing world, the reverse is true (Meeks). Nation states were formed, modeled on modern states, without having sufficiently powerful groups to fill the roles of contesting and organised citizens. Nor did many citizens find themselves in a national power structure and logic that aligned well with formal constitutional and electoral rules. Those formal rules were often not tailored to the contemporary political realities of the specific contexts where they were to be implemented (Chabal).

In light of this, the power to contest and act collectively faces very different conditions in developing countries in comparison to modern states, as the factors of inequality and human agency capacity are structural constraints of considerable importance (Dahl and Shapiro). Given recent claims that the control of corruption is a question of shifting an equilibrium that requires collective action (Mungiu-Pippidi), power is at the heart of a change in that equilibrium.

Whatever one may think of traditional development theory versus post-development theory, popular collective action comes close to a perfect mix of theories and political views. Traditional development theory (modernist version) refers to the need for industrialisation policies to achieve economic growth, leading to modernisation (Potter et al.). Modernity refers to the period beginning sometime before the Second World War and is characterised by a move away from feudalism/agrarianism towards industrialisation, capitalism, universalism, rationalism, secularism and the rise of the nation state (Loper; Jakimow). Whereas that modernisation theory sees development as a top down approach, post-development scholars that reject modernism argue that development must come from below, emphasising grassroots’ participation and new social movements as the medium of change (Potter et al.). Collective action to achieve change and hold corrupt governments to account appears to strive for the modernist version of development, while using the means of development offered by post-developmentalists. The relevance of this awareness is that supporting collective action in anti-corruption is neither apolitical as regards societal development ideals, nor as regards how those ideals should be achieved.

Political and theoretical inclinations aside, power distribution will nevertheless be a factor for change in either view (Akmeemana et al.). A quick reference to inequality and control of corruption shows that less economic inequality has a relatively weak positive correlation to better control of corruption (Holmberg and Rothstein). A stronger correlation can be found in the relationship between the length of education (Holmberg and Rothstein) and the length of its existence (Uslaner and Rothstein). Whereas, correlation is not the same as causation, education clearly contributes to the decentralisation of societal power concentration via empowerment of human agency, i.e. “the human capability to exert influence over one’s functioning and the course of events by one’s actions” (Carr, p. 8; Poggi; Sherrod et al.). The same can be said about more inclusive economic growth through broad-based private sector economic development (World Economic Forum; Mungiu-Pippidi and Johnston; Mungiu-Pippidi). Historically, both have played important roles for changes in the structure of societal power leading towards stronger governance and development (Caenegem; Tilly; You). Although that perspective represents a much longer timeframe for change than most development policies envisage for anti-corruption and anti-IFF measures, it is difficult to see how it can be bypassed.

Conclusion

This analysis has shown how corruption relates to IFF and introduced a much broader understanding of the role of corruption in IFF. Corruption facilitates illegal transfers, since corrupt regimes need to access the international financial system to hide and eventually enjoy the proceeds of their looting. Corruption facilitates the illegal activities that generate the illicit funds themselves. Corruption also incapacitates public and private institutions that could prevent or detect the transfers, such as financial institutions, intelligence agencies, tax, customs, or trade authorities (Attila). Adding to that, corruption itself can be a source of funds for IFF, while it can also have the role of facilitating the illegal use of funds that have crossed a border by making those with a role to prevent it instead receive an illicit personal or group benefit by looking the other way.

We have also considered the need to pay close attention to different contexts and the corresponding conditions for positive human agency when incorporating anti-corruption policies in anti-IFF strategies.

Current anti-IFF policies need to take into account corruption’s many different roles in facilitating IFF. In particular, policy makers should recognise that corruption is not only — as commonly suggested—a source of illicit funds, but is also a fundamental hurdle to implementing anti-IFF measures at country level. If anti-IFF measures are to be effective, ignoring the many roles of corruption in enabling IFF is not an option.

References

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Note: The problem with some empirical evidence is that it uses aggregate and relatively crude indicators to assess whether the prevalence of corruption changes over time. If what is measured is so aggregated that it cannot distinguish the effects of governance reforms on processes and other factors or dynamics that influence the targeted type and location of corruption, such indicators are directly unsuitable to measure the effects of reform efforts. An example of an indicator that cannot distinguish between different types of corruption, nor say anything about private-to-private corruption, nor identify any geographical in-country differences as would be relevant for local reform efforts is the World Wide Governance Indicator on Control of Corruption. Due to the dearth of useful indicators to measure reform effects, U4 conducts the Proxy Challenge on a bi-annual basis to seek to encourage the identification of bespoke proxy indicators that can inform about whether reforms are having any effect on corruption or not.

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All views expressed in this post are those of the author(s), and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the U4 partner agencies, or CMI/U4.