2024 Taiwan Elections: Foreign Influence Observation — Preliminary Statement

Digital Intelligence Team, Doublethink Lab

Key Findings

1. Prior to December 2023, PRC-related information operation assets amplified select existing internal conflicts in Taiwan. The stories selected for amplification included the import of allegedly poisoned eggs, alleged lies about the origins of imported eggs and pork, alleged political scandals and incompetence surrounding the production of submarines, whether conscripts would be sent to the battlefield if the PRC invades, controversies over the influx of 100,000 Indian workers to Taiwan, William Lai’s alleged illegal housing projects, and alleged sex scandals among DPP politicians. These stories attempted to degrade their adversary (i.e., the DPP) and connect to deep narratives about DPP corruption, ethical defects, misgovernance, and playing politics with the safety of Taiwanese people.
2. As election day approached, PRC-related information operation assets became more active initiators of information manipulation. They initiated stories including the potential termination of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), claims that the DPP were spreading rumors about CCP action against the Taiwanese band Mayday for allegedly lip-syncing, the claim that William Lai has an illegitimate son, and the publication of an entire book on the “Secret History of Tsai Ing-Wen” in which President Tsai Ing-wen is falsely depicted using her body to rise to power. These stories attempted to reinforce narratives about alleged ethical defects of DPP candidates and Taiwan’s supposed grim economic prospects should the DPP be elected.
3. Compared to the 2022 election, among the two largest information manipulation campaigns that we observed (i.e., Lai’s illegitimate son and Tsai’s secret history), the participation of PRC state media and Weibo influencers was relatively rare. Instead, these campaigns relied on a large number of inauthentic social media assets and used generative AI to produce a large-scale spam campaign. We hypothesized that the CCP may have deemed that personal attacks defaming Taiwanese politicians were incompatible with the role that they envision state media to play. Moreover, they may have recognized that such attacks coming from easily attributable sources in the PRC would backfire with Taiwanese voters. Attack patterns that rely on inauthentic social media assets and do not involve the participation of actors under direct control of the CCP leave fewer traces for investigators, which increases the difficulty of attribution and likely improves the effectiveness of such campaigns among Taiwanese audiences.
4. Facebook fan pages operated predominantly from Cambodia were active in targeting Taiwanese audiences starting from October 2023. These actors focused on stories that were connected to narratives degrading the DPP and promoting US skepticism.
5. In the future, we hypothesize that PRC foreign information manipulation and interference may develop in directions that continue to blur the boundaries between local and foreign information manipulation, which will make attribution more difficult and increase its effectiveness among local audiences. First, we expect to see local conflicts continue to be exploited and state media and publicly attributable PRC actors continue to amplify such conflicts. Second, we expect that content will increasingly become localized and that local proxies and ideologically-aligned actors will be exploited. Third, we believe we will likely see the use of more AI to generate similar text that is not copy-pasted, short video content that is cheap to varied and cheap to produce at scale, and the automation of social media account behavior to make it harder to link assets in batches.

Project Introduction

During the 2024 Taiwanese Presidential Elections, Doublethink Lab collaborated with numerous organizations and individuals, including fact-checking organizations, scholars, cybersecurity researchers, and civil society groups. Together, we coordinated an information observation project targeting foreign influences on the election. To meet the manpower requirements for nationwide election observation, the project organized a four-day analyst summer training course in August 2023. The course trained a total of 32 students, from which 17 interns were selected. These interns, along with 8 part-time staff who had participated in the 2022 Taiwan Local elections observation project and analysts from Doublethink Lab, collectively conducted daily observations and investigations on Taiwan’s major social media platforms and collected data from October 1, 2023, to January 31, 2024. The focus of their observations included:

1. Information related to elections or current events in Taiwan that is false.
2. Narratives aligning with China’s common information warfare against Taiwan.
3. Involvement of actors from China in spreading information.
4. Coordinated inauthentic behavior on social media platforms.

As of January 13, 2024, we had recorded a total of approximately 10,141 pieces of suspicious information. Based on this data, we categorized different types of actors, timelines of events, key issues emphasized by China regarding Taiwan, and tactics employed.

Figure 1: Weekly Record of Suspicious Information During the Election Period

Types of Actors

The accounts collected in this observation project are categorized based on their origin (China or overseas), anonymity, coordination, and authenticity of individual accounts:

PRC State Media:

Accounts are identified based on the list announced by the Chinese National Internet Information Office and media directly affiliated with central or local Chinese official entities.

Chinese Commercial Media:

Chinese media whose organizational structure is not directly affiliated with central or local Chinese official entities.

Overseas Anonymous Fan Pages / TikTok Accounts / YouTube Channels / X Accounts / Weibo Influencers:

Accounts that do not reveal the user’s real identity or the administrator’s location, as indicated on the fan page; are not in Taiwan; or their displayed location is not in Taiwan.

Suspected Overseas Anonymous Fan Pages / TikTok Accounts / YouTube Channels / X Accounts:

Accounts that do not reveal the users’ real identity. Although the administrator’s location is shown as Taiwan on the fan page or it is not displayed, the account’s introduction and posted content contain many simplified Chinese characters, Chinese terms, misspelled names, and views that align with the Chinese standpoint.

Taiwanese Anonymous Political Commentary Fan Pages / TikTok Accounts / YouTube Channels / X Accounts:

Accounts that do not reveal the user’s real identity and no overseas location, simplified characters, or language errors are detected. Their posts involve Taiwanese politics or edited clips of opinions from influential figures in Taiwan.

Inauthentic Accounts / Coordinated Accounts / Highly Suspicious Anonymous Accounts:

Accounts that do not reveal the user’s real identity and disguise themselves as regular individuals. They may further engage in coordinated behavior to publish articles or comments, influencing public perception of specific issues.

Table 1. Comparison of Deep Narratives, Stories, Platforms, and Actor Types in Each Case

In addition to documenting suspicious information on the internet, we chronologically listed physical events that have occurred leading up to the current election. Finally, we analyzed the extent of involvement among PRC officials and state media, Chinese platforms, overseas anonymous accounts, and coordinated accounts based on the categories of suspicious information. This will be further explained in the next section.

Figure 2. Timeline of Online and Offline Events

Key Issues Emphasized by China Regarding Taiwan

Based on the suspicious information and topics we recorded, we identified several key themes that China actively promotes or amplifies. These themes encompass aspects of livelihood, national defense, public security and diplomacy, economy, culture, and controversies involving political figures. Explanations for each aspect are as follows:

Livelihood

Imported Egg Controversy

Starting in 2022, Taiwan experienced a reduction in egg supply due to avian flu and rising feed prices, which led to a rapid increase in retail prices and a shortage of eggs in the market. In response, the Ministry of Agriculture announced an initiative on imported eggs by implementing subsidies in March 2023. Beginning in August 2023, information manipulation related to policy on imported eggs included stories such as “Ultra Source Limited [an egg importer] importing carcinogenic poisoned eggs,” “Expired and foul-smelling eggs imported by Ultra Source[an egg importer],” “DPP deceiving the public by changing the origin of imported liquid eggs to Taiwan,” and “DPP colluding with Ultra Source for personal gain.” In our investigation, we found that Taiwan’s anonymous political commentary accounts used reports and comments from Taiwanese media and political figures to create a large number of meme images and texts for the aforementioned stories. These were then shared by suspicious personal accounts across major online communities. However, accounts exhibiting coordinated behavior, spreading misinformation, or raising suspicions added meme images with specific hashtags like “#台農董座#涂萬財#巴西臭蛋 #農業部 #陳吉仲”(#TaiNongChairman #TuWanTsai #BrazilianStinkEgg #MinistryOfAgriculture #ChenChiChung) and shared them in anti-DPP public groups. PRC state media played a role in setting the tone for the story on Weibo after the direction was established in Taiwan. Additionally, on Facebook, suspected overseas anonymous fan pages, such as 政事每天報 (Political Daily), 每日資訊速報 (Daily New), 熱點新聞報 (Hot News Report), 話仙 (Taiwan Gossip King), and 新聞一起看 (News Check34), used meme images to emphasize the idea that government imports would result in poisoned carcinogenic eggs. They attempted to increase the exposure of related content by using hashtags such as #進口蛋, #毒雞蛋進口 (#ImportedEggs #ToxicImportedEggs), and more. Through the use of inauthentic accounts, these posts were shared across major public groups. The tactic employed involved initiating a political narrative within Taiwan first. Taiwanese anonymous political commentary accounts and accounts exhibiting coordinated behavior raised the discussion level of the topic. China then seized the opportunity to use official media and social media accounts to increase public panic about food safety and to establish and reinforce the impression that the DPP is favoring specific corporations.

Figure 3. Coordinated Accounts Sharing “#台農董座#涂萬財#巴西臭蛋 #農業部 #陳吉仲”(#TaiNongChairman #TuWanTsai #BrazilianStinkEgg #MinistryOfAgriculture #ChenChiChung) and Meme Images

Country of Origin Labeling Controversy of American Imported Pork

Following the controversy over the origin labeling of imported liquid eggs, discussions on origin labeling extended to pork. Starting from September 2023, the stories related to pork origin labeling were as follows: “American pork with ractopamine, when processed in Taiwan, becomes Taiwanese pork, indicating false origin (washing the origin),” “People have already consumed American pork with ractopamine with false labeling,” and “The government uses the Taiwanese pork label to allow American pork to be on the shelves.” PRC state media and commercial media such as 台海网 (TaiHaiNet), 海峡导报 (Strait Daobao), 今日海峽 (Strait News), and 华夏经纬网 (Huaxia Jingwei News) with the theme “DPP is the initiator of origin washing” reposted articles from Taiwanese media and released videos promoting stories like “Taiwanese people have already consumed American pork” and “The Taiwanese pork label is a government means to confuse and allow the circulation of American pork.” These stories combine the suspicion of America and create distrust among the ruling party. Similar to the Imported Egg Controversy, we found that Taiwanese anonymous political commentary accounts and accounts with coordinated behavior used meme images, specific phrases, and hashtags to echo China’s negative views on the ruling party. Additionally, in the LINE rumor reports collected by MyGoPen, we found that messages that induced panic among the public by referring to past food safety concerns were concentrated in October. The collaboration between Taiwanese and Chinese actors in disseminating this topic reinforced and prolonged the panic among Taiwanese people about food safety and their distrust in the ruling party and the United States.

Figure 4. Chinese Official Media and Commercial Media Using Taiwan Media Materials to Promote the Story “Taiwan FDA Helps the U.S. Label American Pork as Taiwanese Pork” Across Platforms.

National Defense

Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS)

Taiwan’s first indigenous submarine, the “Haiyun,” held its naming and launching ceremony on September 28, 2023. As reports on submarines continued to increase, the following narratives emerged: “Taiwan lacks the capability to manufacture submarines” and “Issues abound in the indigenous submarine program.” In the narrative depicting Taiwan’s lack of capability to manufacture submarines, PRC state media and Weibo influencers, such as 台海网 (TaiHaiNet), 海峡导报社 (Strait Daobao), and UFO启示 (UFO Revelation), took excerpts from Taiwanese political talk shows and disseminated videos and posts with titles like “Submarines cannot be produced; they can’t even make subway cars” and “Unable to produce three submarines by 2025” to downplay Taiwan’s ability to develop military infrastructure domestically. In addition, articles titled “South Korean companies assisting Taiwan in manufacturing submarines face prosecution” and “The oldest submarine is in Taiwan” were published, casting doubt on Taiwan’s competence in creating indigenous military assets.

In the narrative emphasizing issues in the indigenous submarine program, PRC state media and Weibo accounts established hashtags such as “#台自造潜艇投标案被质疑#, #台自造潜艇得标商成立48天拿到设计标案#, and #国台办回应台自造潜艇争议不断#”(#TaiwanIndigenousSubmarineBidControversy#,#TaiwanIndigenousSubmarineBidderEstablishedIn48DaysReceivedDesignBid#, and#TaiwanAffairsOfficeRespondsto OngoingDisputeoverTaiwan’sIndigenousSubmarine#”) to share videos and articles related to accusations made by KMT legislator Ma Wen-chun during questioning. Furthermore, accounts such as 海峡之声 (Voice of the Strait), 厦门广电 (Xiamen Media Group) on Weibo, and PRC state media used reports from Taiwanese media to allege that associates and relatives of President Tsai Ing-wen were involved in the indigenous submarine program, attempting to portray the project as a government scandal. Taiwanese anonymous political commentary pages, such as 新聞總匯三明治 (News Digest Sandwich), went a step further by combining conspiracy theories about government–business collusion related to rapid testing kits, imported eggs, and the indigenous submarine program. They created meme images and posts with a set of hashtags like “#民進黨 #賴清德 #陳建仁 #弊案疑雲 #監督執政 #打擊歪哥 #下架不良政客” (“#DPP #WilliamLai #ChenChienJen #ScandalSuspicions #SuperviseTheGovernment #FightAgainstCorruptPoliticians”), which were then shared through collaborative accounts. Moreover, hashtags such as “#民進黨 #超思 #陳建仁 #賴清德” (“#DPP #UltraSource #ChenChienJen #WilliamLai”) were shared in groups supporting the Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). This topic mainly focused on certain Taiwanese media guiding discussions on the indigenous submarine program toward concerns about the submarine’s quality and allegations of government–business collusion. PRC state media and social media accounts then selectively amplified the story, portraying Taiwan’s military equipment manufacturing standards as subpar within Chin. Moreover, this orchestrated effort empowered Taiwanese media to align with China’s official narrative, fostering confidence to emphasize the same storyline. The same mode of propagation is evident, with Taiwanese anonymous political commentary pages creating meme images and sharing posts through collaborative accounts.

Figure 5. PRC State Media and Weibo Influencers Selecting Content from Taiwanese Media to Amplify the Narrative of Collusion between Government and Business.

Compulsory Military Service in Combat

On October 16, 2022, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense announced its annual budget, leading to political figures questioning the adequacy of the military’s resources and suggesting that compulsory military service would become the main combat force. Subsequent stories included “William Lai’s family is in the United States; he won’t go to the battlefield when war breaks out” and “William Lai deceives voters with rhetoric.” PRC state media on Facebook, Baidu, NetEase, TikTok, and other platforms mainly focused on the narrative that “the DPP is leading Taiwan to the battlefield.” They disseminated video and article excerpts from Taiwanese media that emphasized a shortage in Taiwanese military personnel and alleged that the DPP, in collaboration with external forces, is pushing Taiwanese youth into battle. We also identified suspected overseas anonymous fan pages such as 清白評論 (Innocent Comment Circle), 橙子有話說 (Orange Has Something to Say), 新聞嘴 (News Mouth), 新聞趣事(News Anecdote), all of which shared memes or posts combining the aforementioned stories and narratives. These were then shared by suspicious individual or inauthentic accounts into groups opposing the DPP and supporting the KMT. Additionally, some accounts used a set of relevant and high-impact hashtags like “#瞎搞 #兵役 #賴清德 #義務役 #不用上戰場 #國防部長 #打臉”(“#MessingAround #MilitaryService #WilliamLai #CompulsoryMilitaryService #NotGoingToTheBattlefield #MinisterOfNationalDefense #Exposed”) in an attempt to share a large number of memes that depicted Vice President William Lai and Minister of National Defense Chiu Kuo-cheng issuing contradictory statements. These posts were more broadly disseminated to other major social media groups.

Figure 6. On Facebook, Collaborative Accounts Sharing the Hashtags “#瞎搞 #兵役 #賴清德 #義務役 #不用上戰場 #國防部長 #打臉” (“#MessingAround #MilitaryService #WilliamLai #CompulsoryMilitaryService #NotGoingToTheBattlefield #MinisterOfNationalDefense #Exposed”) and Memes.

Security and Diplomacy

Arrival of 100,000 Indian Migrant Workers

On September 26, 2023, the Hindustan Times reported that Taiwan and India would sign a memorandum to bring 100,000 Indian migrant workers to address the labor shortage in labor-intensive industries. By mid-November, Taiwanese media and online forums (PTT and Dcard) simplified the discourse of Bloomberg’s report, which stated “Taiwan could recruit up to 100,000 Indian migrant workers,” and reinforced the stories “India is a country of sexual assault” and “Taiwan is turning into a rape island.” This narrative caused panic among the Taiwanese population. The PRC state media followed Taiwan’s media reports, publishing articles and videos related to the title “Taiwan will import 100,000 Indian laborers, causing dissatisfaction on the island.” This further emphasized the negative image of India and intensified the contradiction and strong dissatisfaction among Taiwan’s population regarding this issue. We also found the participation of coordinated inauthentic accounts related to China in the comments section under Radio Free Asia’s posts on X. A group of inauthentic accounts, all created after July 2023, used pictures of young women as profile pictures, marked their location as Taiwan, and consistently expressed opinions such as “Importing Indian migrant workers has no benefits” and “Better off cooperating with the mainland.” However, upon closer examination of the reply history of these accounts, we found that all of them replied in simplified Chinese characters on topics related to Taiwan. Attempting to pretend to be Taiwanese, these accounts directed the attitudes of the comments section toward a favorable opinion of China, exacerbating the opposition between Taiwanese and Indian societies.

This topic quickly transitioned from online discussions to offline mobilization and was pushed by PRC state media and inauthentic accounts. In less than a month, there was an attempt to mobilize members from Dcard and LINE communities, resulting in the “123 Don’t Come, India” protest against the opening of Indian migrant workers on December 3. The actual number of participants was nearly 100, significantly fewer than the nearly 10,000 members across online communities. Nevertheless, the process from the initial media reports to rapid mobilization, which was fueled by PRC state media and inauthentic accounts, underscores the potential impact of this online discussion-to-mobilization pipeline in similar future scenarios.

Figure 7. Coordinated Behavior of Overseas Inauthentic Accounts on X Using Simplified Chinese Characters Similar to Comments.

Economy

China Initiates Trade Barrier Investigation and Partially Halts Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) Tariff Reductions

On April 12, 2023, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced the initiation of a trade barrier investigation against Taiwan, and on December 15, the investigation results were released. On the same day, Zhu Fenglian, a spokesperson for the Taiwan Affairs Office, stated, “The DPP unilaterally restricts the entry of mainland products, which does not conform to the normalization of cross-strait relations under ECFA, damages relevant mainland interests, and also harms the interests of Taiwanese consumers.” On December 20, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced the suspension of tariff reductions on 12 chemical raw materials imported from Taiwan under the ECFA. On Weibo, PRC state media established two trending topics: “#台湾对大陆贸易限制构成贸易壁垒” (“#Taiwan’s Trade Restrictions on the Mainland Constitute a Trade Barrier#”) and “#中止对台湾地区部分产品关税减让#” (“#Suspend Tariff Reductions on Certain Products in Taiwan Region#”). These topics reached the sixth and first places in the Weibo hot search, respectively, positioning the issue as a hot topic. The main stories shared by Chinese media and some Taiwanese media were, “The DPP claims ECFA is a sugar-coated poison but has not abolished it to this day; it is double standards and acting” and “The DPP only blames the mainland, with no intention of improving cross-strait relations.” We also found suspected overseas anonymous fan pages, such as “Face-slapping William Lai, Peeling off the DPP,” creating memes related to “If William Lai is elected, China may suspend ECFA, and Taiwan’s economy will worsen.” These were accompanied by hashtags like “#ECFA #賴清德” (“#ECFA #WilliamLai”) and were then shared by inauthentic accounts in a coordinated manner. This approach initially established a narrative direction, portraying the DPP as unilaterally damaging cross-strait relations, and was followed by media and political figures from both China and Taiwan with similar stances, supplementing stories about “how” the DPP unilaterally damages cross-strait relations. On X, 450 robot accounts created between October 14 and 29, 2023, shared the same news, emphasizing “If William Lai is elected, China may suspend ECFA.” These robot accounts mainly disseminated content related to suspicions about the U.S. and tensions in cross-strait relations, with identical posting sequences. To further spread the story, the content was published by suspected overseas anonymous fan pages, shared by coordinated inauthentic accounts, and disseminated using numerous robot accounts, all of which influenced the general public’s sense of economic panic.

Figure 8. Fake Coordinated Accounts on Facebook Created in December 2023, Sharing “If William Lai is elected, Taiwan’s economy will worsen” and Other Similar Posts.

Culture

China accuses DPP of spreading rumors and pressuring the band Mayday

On December 2, 2023, Chinese content creator 麦田农夫 (Cornfield Farmer) released a video on the Bilibili platform alleging that the Taiwanese band Mayday lip-synced during a concert. There have been nearly 67 trending topics on Weibo related to Mayday in December as the event sparked intense discussions in China. According to Reuters, the Mayday lip-syncing controversy is related to Mayday’s refusal to comply with the request of China’s National Radio and Television Administration and the band publicly stating that Taiwan is part of China. However, after the report was released, Chen Binhua, the spokesman of the Taiwan Affairs Office of China, responded by saying that the report was unfounded, stating, “The Democratic Progressive Party authorities are deliberately spreading rumors. This is sinister and malicious political manipulation.” Subsequently, Taiwanese media and KMT political figures, such as Cai Zhengyuan and Hou Hanting, as well as suspected overseas anonymous fan pages like “鑒天下” (“Insights into the World”) and “橙子有話說” (“Orange Has Something to Say”), echoed the statements of the Taiwan Affairs Office, claiming that the DPP was manufacturing internal propaganda and fake news and engaging in political manipulation.

In addition, we observed that on December 31, China’s state media posted a video of cross-strait singers singing “Tomorrow Will Be Better” on YouTube, TikTok, and other platforms, creating an image of cross-strait unity. The promotion of this song was boosted by ZhiXing on Facebook, who continuously invested advertising funds in posts that promoted the song to increase engagement. On one hand, China used the “Raise, Ensnare, Terminate” approach to compel Taiwanese artists to declare that Taiwan is a part of China in exchange for allowing them to perform and profit in the country; failing to comply can then lead to the artists being investigated or even blacklisted, causing them to be “ensnared” or “terminated.” On the other hand, by promoting songs featuring cross-strait artists, the posts aimed to attract fans of Taiwanese artists and cultivate positive expectations toward China. Therefore, such tactics from China constitute a form of cultural warfare.

Figure 9. China Promotes “Cross-Strait Unity” Narrative through TikTok and Facebook Ads, Featuring Cross-Strait Singers.

Controversial Incidents Among Political Figures

William Lai’s Alleged Violation of Building Codes in Wanli

Throughout the year, there have been controversies surrounding violations of building codes by Taiwan’s political figures’ ancestral homes. On September 5, 2023, a post on the PTT forum mentioned that DPP presidential candidate William Lai’s ancestral home in Wanli, New Taipei City, was designated for mining use and could not be used for residential purposes. Stories related to this event included “William Lai’s ancestral home is not only a building violation but also tax evasion,” and “Other people’s houses are violations, but William Lai’s ancestral home is not; DPP has double standards.” PRC state media and Weibo accounts immediately reposted Taiwanese media reports about “William Lai’s ancestral home being a violation” with an article and video the next day. On Facebook, there were suspected overseas anonymous fan pages like “反爆股長” (“Anti-stock Boom”), which posted memes with captions such as “台獨金孫(Chief Heir of Taiwan independence)” and “違建金孫(Chief Heir of violating building codes).” These were then shared extensively by highly suspicious coordinated accounts in groups supporting the KMT and opposing the DPP. Another group of accounts used hashtags related to William Lai’s ancestral home violation, such as “#賴清德 #違建 #假清高 #打臉 #門牌” (“#WilliamLai #Violation #FakeHighMoralGround #Expose #HouseNumber”), along with memes, shared in groups supporting the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) and the KMT. Another group of overseas anonymous fan pages posted screenshots from inauthentic accounts from other platforms and shared them through inauthentic accounts to major groups. For a detailed explanation of this technique, please refer to “Imitating Local Sentiments: Analysis of Foreign Facebook Fan Pages’ Intervention in Taiwanese Elections.”

Figure 10. Cambodia’s Overseas Anonymous Fan Page “24/7 Convenience Store” and Coordinated Accounts Share to Major Groups on Facebook.

Sex Scandals of DPP Political Figures

There were several sex scandals involving DPP political figures throughout the year, with some events still awaiting confirmation. The individuals involved included legislator Chao Tien-lin, Deputy Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council Liang Wen-chieh, Deputy Premier Cheng Wen-tsan, and legislator Lo Chih-cheng. Stories related to these events included “Opposing and resisting China is work; being pro-China and copying China is life.,” and “DPP high officials have extramarital affairs and go to hotels.” The main narrative was that “the peach blossom culture[1] has become a part of the mainstream culture of the Democratic Progressive Party.” The incident involving Chao Tien-lin was the first of its kind observed in this analysis. After Taiwan’s media received a tip-off, overseas anonymous fan pages such as “C咖出道” (“C Celebrity Debut”) and coordinated pages with admins from Cambodia immediately turned the narrative into memes and videos, adding hashtags and posting on Facebook. Highly suspicious or inauthentic accounts then shared these posts in their personal profiles or to major groups. The “C咖出道” (“C Celebrity Debut”) account produced a video featuring a virtual host in Memoji style, processed using a voice modification, describing peach blossom culture as a part of the mainstream culture of the Democratic Progressive Party. The comments on the video featured a group of coordinated inauthentic accounts posting unrelated comments in English and liking the video to increase the interaction count. Additionally, a surveillance video allegedly showing “Cheng Wen-tsan bringing a young woman into a hotel room” was released, which followed closely after the Chao Tien-lin incident. The video was first released by the anonymous Taiwanese political commentary fan page “Next逆襲” (“Next Counterattack”) supporting the KMT. Subsequently, PRC state media, Weibo influencers, Taiwanese media, political figures, and anonymous accounts from various social media platforms contributed to the dissemination of related videos and content. The focus of the information manipulation on the sex scandals of DPP political figures included the appearance of hashtags such as “#性lie台灣” (“#SexLieTaiwan”) and “#性賴台灣” (“#SexLaiTaiwan”), replacing the negative terms “peach blossom” and “deception” for the DPP’s election slogan “Trust Taiwan.”

Figure 11. Overseas Anonymous Fan Pages Create Virtual Host Videos and Increase Interaction with Inauthentic Accounts.

William Lai’s Alleged Illegitimate Child

Information about William Lai’s alleged illegitimate child dates back to 2015 when it was first reported in the news. In October 2023, Qiu Yi mentioned the alleged illegitimate child again during a live broadcast with Taiwanese influencer Bit King. Subsequently, in November and December, some overseas fan pages focused on the issue. However, the most extensive operation began around January 9, 2024, continuing until the day of the election. On January 3, Hong Kong’s Wen Wei Po quoted Qiu Yi’s remarks, mentioning William Lai’s mistress and illegitimate child.

On January 12th, X saw a staggering 7,537 related posts in a single day that originated from 1,638 different accounts. Among these accounts, 73% were created in November 2023, suggesting they were likely established for activities during the election period. Of the over 7,500 posts, 94% consisted of identical content that was copied and pasted. These repeated phrases were posted at least eight times or more, indicating a clear and extensive coordinated information operation.

Simultaneously, PRC state media reported sporadically on Facebook, news platforms, and Weibo. Hong Kong media, fan pages, and suspected overseas anonymous fan pages also mentioned the operation. Some Facebook posts appeared to have purchased likes and shares from Arabic and Southeast Asian accounts. On Facebook and Youtube, there were instances of inauthentic accounts spreading content in Simplified Chinese. Some of these accounts had previously shared Chinese political propaganda aimed at whitewashing Hong Kong.

Additionally, the operation gained coverage from pro-China news media and low-profile news websites in various countries, including Malaysia, the Philippines, India, and Canada. On LINE, reports on William Lai’s alleged illegitimate child began on January 5th and peaked on January 10th and 11th, just before the election. This wave of operations against the DPP presidential candidate followed the information about the sex scandals involving DPP politicians. The narrative suggested that William Lai, with multiple mistresses and an alleged illegitimate child (Lai Ting-han), had significant moral flaws through which the narrative attempted to influence the election outcome. Despite William Lai’s clarification on the eve of the election, the dissemination of related information did not abate.

Figure 12. Coordinated Operation on Facebook to Disseminate the Narrative of William Lai’s Alleged Illegitimate Child.

Secret History of Tsai Ing-wen

In the lead-up to the January 2024 elections, information about the “Secret History of Tsai Ing-wen” circulated on major social media platforms, video streaming platforms, and forums. This extensive “book,” exceeding 100,000 words, first appeared around December 28, 2023, and was uploaded as a Word document on ufile.io. Subsequent manipulation of the information were sourced from Word and PDF files uploaded to zenodo.org on January 2, 2024. As of the time of writing, the file has been downloaded over 27,000 times.

The anonymous author of “Tsai Ing-wen’s Secret History” goes by the pseudonym “Taiwanese Writer” Lin Leshu. However, the content reveals numerous Chinese terms and errors resulting from the conversion between simplified and traditional characters (e.g., “髮現”[2] ). Based on the image names and insertion paths in the .docx file, it is evident that the source image files are in Simplified Chinese. The likelihood of the content being written by a Taiwanese individual is very low.

Throughout this operation, coordinated efforts by inauthentic accounts on Facebook, X, YouTube, and TikTok were observed. Many prominent individuals and influencers reported receiving numerous emails and messages inundated with information about the “Secret History of Tsai Ing-wen.” Additionally, the content was disseminated through some lesser known foreign news media, likely posted by inauthentic accounts on various online forums and communities.

Notably absent were the typical Chinese propaganda tools, including PRC state media, Hong Kong media, Weibo influencers, and Facebook pages suspected to be overseas anonymous fan pages. The spread of misinformation encompassed various formats, including text and images, mainly appearing on Facebook, X, emails and messages, Wikipedia, low-profile news media websites, and major online discussion communities. Brief descriptions claimed that the book unveils a distorted, sinister, and unknown side of Tsai Ing-wen and provided a link to the original document on zenodo. Regarding audio-visual content, YouTube and TikTok were the primary platforms, featuring over twenty different versions of AI-generated virtual anchor videos from Capcut and voices reading different chapters of the “Secret History of Tsai Ing-wen”. The inauthentic accounts involved in spreading this information also exhibited international characteristics, including the use of Simplified Chinese, errors in converting Simplified characters to Traditional ones, and some accounts that had previously spread anti-American propaganda as puppets for Guo Wengui and Li-Meng Yan but transitioned to disseminating the “Secret History.”

The scope of the operation was extensive, with X alone having over 2,000 pieces of related content. This substantial investment of resources suggests the intention to create a negative impression of Tsai Ing-wen and possibly influence the election outcome.

Figure 13: Numerous Newly Established YouTube Channels Spreading “Secret History” Videos on the Day of Creation, Alongside a Substantial Coordination of Inauthentic X Accounts Transitioning from Anti-American Propaganda to Disseminating the “Secret History.”

Conclusion

In summary, we have identified that, in the early stages of the Taiwanese election season, China continued its strategy from 2022 by amplifying internal controversies in Taiwan. PRC state media, commercial media, and influential accounts on Chinese platforms used Taiwanese media, political figures, and political commentary fan pages to re-amplify pre-existing stories and narratives within Taiwan, such as “The DPP benefiting specific businesses,” “The DPP deceiving the public with false food labeling,” “The DPP leading Taiwan towards the battlefield,” “William Lai’s hometown violating construction regulations and evading taxes,” and “Peach blossom culture becoming a part of the mainstream culture of the DPP.” These narratives covered controversial events related to people’s livelihoods, national defense, and political figures. While these events did not originate from China, by selecting specific narratives, China propagated negative messages and anti-government sentiments, which resonated with lower-tier accounts on Chinese platforms, overseas anonymous accounts, and pro-China political figures and media in Taiwan. This echoed China’s chosen focus and reiterated such narratives, influencing the perception of the Taiwanese people. Additionally, attackers collaborated using inauthentic accounts, employing hashtags related to the themes, and extensively sharing content in various online communities or posting on personal pages to enhance the spread of narratives and shape public opinion in line with the aforementioned narratives.

As election day approached, we observed information manipulation initiated by China, such as launching trade barrier investigations against Taiwan, accusing the DPP of spreading rumors, and alleging that China put pressure on the band Mayday. Rumors were also spread about William Lai having an illegitimate child, and the “Secret History” of Tsai Ing-wen was circulated on social media platforms. These rumors involved narratives regarding the economy, culture, and DPP political figures. Economically, China’s Ministry of Commerce and Taiwan Affairs Office framed the DPP government as unilaterally undermining cross-strait relations. This narrative was further promoted on Weibo’s trending topics, and content was extensively shared by Chinese platform accounts and Taiwanese media, suggesting that “the DPP benefits from ECFA and blames the mainland.” Anonymous fan pages directed public opinion regarding the consequences of William Lai’s victory, with China threatening to suspend ECFA and sparking economic panic among the Taiwanese people. On the cultural front, the Taiwan Affairs Office alleged the DPP of spreading rumors. Pro-PRC individuals in Taiwan echoed the PRC’s claims, asserting that the DPP is engaging in political manipulation by attributing blame to the PRC for the Mayday lip-syncing investigation. Furthermore, PRC state media spreaded a “cross-strait unity” song through cross-platform videos and advertisements, which propagated narratives promoting the closeness of both sides of the strait.

It’s noteworthy that the story of 100,000 Indian migrant workers coming to Taiwan began as online discussions but developed into social movements such as the Ketagalan Boulevard parade. This development involved PRC state media using Taiwanese forums and media, spreading headlines such as “Taiwan wants to become an island of sexual assault.” Under related posts, coordinated inauthentic accounts replied with comments such as, “Introducing Indian migrant workers has no benefits; it’s better to cooperate with the mainland.” Currently, it is uncertain whether China was directly involved with disseminating this narrative and providing resources for the parade. However, given the recent tension in China-India relations, with China viewing India as a major competitor, China may be manipulating Taiwan-India relations through this issue, or whether it may even be affecting Philippines-Taiwan relations and the military dynamics of countries in the Indo-Pacific region.

In this election, China actively launched online operations to disseminate rumors about William Lai’s illegitimate child and the “Secret History” of Tsai Ing-wen. The extensive reach and quantity of information on these two operations demonstrate their importance and showcase the lengths and means attackers are willing to employ to achieve their goals. Compared to China’s operations in the 2022 local elections, in which US skepticism along with the story that the US was hollowing out Taiwan’s semiconductor industry was prevalent, the degree of participation by PRC state media and Weibo influencers in disseminating key narratives in this election was remarkably low. The dissemination of information primarily involved a large number of inauthentic accounts using generative AI methods. The likely reason for this is that the content of these propaganda pieces involved personal attacks defaming Taiwanese politicians whom the PRC deemed unsuitable for state media to spread. Simultaneously, this may be a strategic move to eliminate obvious traces of Chinese intervention in Taiwan. Due to efforts from civil society and the government in recent years, Taiwanese citizens have become more aware of Chinese information operations in Taiwan. Therefore, direct propaganda and operations by official channels may not be as effective, especially when dealing with misinformation that lacks a significant degree of truth. For example, unless the content disseminated in information operations contains a considerable degree of truth (such as in the case of the US skepticism, where it is a fact that the US pushed for TSMC to set up factories in the US for strategic security reasons), misinformation will not be directly promoted and operated by official channels.

Starting in late October 2023, coordinated pages on Facebook with admins from Cambodia attempted to steer Taiwanese public opinion and influence the election results. Their methods involved adopting existing Taiwanese issues and injecting resources to spread narratives and exacerbate social divisions. They demonstrated a deep understanding of the current state of public opinion in Taiwan, adeptly used Taiwanese terminology, and employed local issues to create social conflicts. They even had the capability to modify popular Taiwanese songs to spread controversial information. Due to such a high degree of localization, tracing these information operations back to China is challenging unless there are Simplified Chinese character errors in the posts. Therefore, these localized tactics require further long-term observations.

Future operations may take the following forms: (1) internalizing conflicts, (2) localizing issues and content, and (3) diversifying dissemination behavior. First, China may continue to amplify internal conflicts in Taiwan rather than initiate new events or be the source of information to avoid strengthening the resolve of Taiwanese citizens and further internalize conflicts. Second, by extensively adopting Taiwanese local issues and producing localized content, such operations can appear less foreign and better integrated into Taiwanese social discussions, making it more difficult for researchers to trace whether the information operation originated from abroad. Third, the emergence of generative AI significantly reduces the time and manpower of content creation. Using generative AI to produce text, images, and video content that are similar in meaning but not entirely identical, as well as randomly scheduling posts, comments, or shares, makes it increasingly difficult to detect the coordinated behavior of inauthentic accounts. The way that inauthentic accounts spread information and interact with other accounts will become more challenging to distinguish from the expressions and interactions of genuine citizens. We have already begun to observe similar developments in the comments section of posts in this observation. In the near future, making judgments on foreign information operations with limited information will become challenging, as attackers can efficiently exploit aspects of various platforms to spread information across online discussion spaces.

Footnotes

1. The term “Peach Blossom Culture” (桃色文化) here is used herein to characterize instances involving politicians engaging in extramarital affairs or participating in morally questionable sexual activities, including activities related to the solicitation of sex workers.
2. In simplified Chinese, both “hair” (头发) and “find” (发现) share the character “发.” However, in traditional Chinese, “hair” is represented by “頭髮,” and “find” is written as “發現,” indicating a distinction between the characters in the two writing systems.